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INTRODUCTION
Why do we remember some events or experiences, yet forget others?
Are we more likely to remember our positive experiences, or those that
are negative? The question of how human memory works, and how it
occasionally fails to work, has recently been of great interest to
psychologists. This question is not something new, of course. In fact, it
is a question that has intrigued scientists and philosophers since long
before the field of modern cognitive psychology emerged--a field which
some currently believe holds great promise for clarifying the nature of the
functioning of the human mind.

Science has advanced significantly

since early researchers first explored this area.

Yet, despite a vast

repository of knowledge crystallized from the work of literally thousands
of scientists--chemists, physicists, psychologists, biologists, etc.--the
precise nature of the relationship between emotion/ mood and memory
remains unclear. It is--to borrow the words of Winston Churchill {1959)-"a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Among the problems
intricately woven into the question of how mood affects memory is the
question of how memory itself "works." For example, just how do we
remember? How, we might ask, is remembering "caused"? Further, what
effects do such feeling states as depression, elation, and anxiety have on
the ability to recollect experiences from the past?
Recent examinations of the relationship of mood to memory have
generally adopted formulations from within the domain of cognitive
psychology, a field built around what is essentially a computer metaphor.
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The theoretical bases of current descriptions of the cognitive, affective,
and behavioral aspects of human behavior can, it is hoped, be tested
through methods similar to those used to test the physical models found
in the sciences mentioned above. In accord with this machine metaphor,
recent attempts to explain the relationship between mood and memory
typically employ a "bottom-up" (i.e., inductive) approach. This push for
an inductive science has a history which dates back many centuries. The
goal of such approaches is to gather up as much "basic" information as
possible, and then to build upward toward an evolved understanding of
mental functioning. Important in this respect are network theories of
emotion and memory, which seek to delineate nodal connections after
the presumed functioning of the neurons in the brain (or the bytes of
memory found in a computer). Another feature common among current
memory models is the belief that memory can be divided into more or less
discrete stages corresponding to so-called "storage" and "retrieval"
operations.

In the former phase, information is encountered and

assimilated into existing knowledge structures.

In the latter phase,

information in the ongoing cognitive, emotional, and physical
environment is used in the acquisition of memory from the memory
network. Such concepts make sense if we view the human being as
essentially responding to input stimuli, stimuli which "activate" the
individual in potentially predictable ways.
Two primary areas of research into the nature of mood/emotion and
memory have explored the phenomena known as mood-state-dependent
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memory and mood-congruent memory.

In the former case, any

similarities in the context of "encoding" are expected to facilitate memory
when present again at the time of retrieval.

In the latter case,

congruence between the learner's mood and the affective valence of the
material is expected to facilitate memory. What emerges, however, is
anything but a picture of clarity.

Though there are patches of

consistency in the empirical literature, particularly in the case of mood
congruence, the mechanistic theories (and their attendant learning
theories based on frequency and contiguity) that have been proffered to
account for such findings have generally been unable to subsume and
hence bring order to these diverse results. Why have such formulations
failed?
In what follows, we contrast mechanistic or non-teleological notions
such as Bower's (1981) nodal network theory with Rychlak's (1981)
Logical Learning Theory, the latter of which may be seen as a Kantian
phenomenological perspective. Logical Learning Theory takes a more
individualistic perspective by opposing predication to traditional
cognitive mediational formulations. This is a broad-based theoretical
conception, capable of subsuming (and lending order to) the domains of
both affect and memory. In accord with this more Kantian alternative
we offer the conception of affective assessment to more adequately
account for methodological findings on the functioning of the human
mind, and, in particular, those relating mood and emotion to memory.
Of primary importance is the fact that rather than using nomothetic
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averages in testing our hypotheses about mood and memory, Logical
Learning Theory takes an idiographic (i.e., individually-oriented)
approach. It is expected that by taking into consideration the manner in
which a subject affectively frames a task (i.e., positively or negatively),
and by having subjects individually rate learnable items along a bipolar
dimension of like-dislike, greater order and understanding can be
brought to the diverse methodological findings alluded to above.
Suggestions of the utility of this construct in the extant literature will
also be discussed.

By employing this idiographic methodological

approach in concert with a non-mechanistic theoretical understanding of
the functioning of mind, we hope to render a more cogent account of the
nature of mood and memory.

CHAPTER 1
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In order to make clear the crucial differences in the accounts to be
presented, time is here taken to delineate some of the fundamental
distinctions in the terminology to be employed.

The Grounds of Explanation in Psychological Science
The notion of causation, particularly as it relates to human behavior,
is extremely important to the present discussion. Theories of causation
can form part of, or be derived from, broad metaphysical doctrines, and
in this light it may be seen that such doctrines delineate for their
authors what sorts of things may be taken to be causes.

This is

important, insofar as what one takes to be a cause has great significance
for what kind of theory of causation one finds acceptable. As suggested
above, scientists have all too often failed to conceptualize even the
possibility of intentional human behavior. Royce ( 1988), commenting on
this predicament, has stated:
Psychologists can easily discover free choice. Their problem is to
explain it, and the attempt is doomed to failure at the outset if
you start with confused philosophical concepts of causality,
chance, predictability, and the like. To understand choice requires
a philosophical competence, including what Aristotle called 'first
philosophy' or metaphysics, to which few psychologists ever
aspired. The dilemma was this: the facts of free choice kept
reappearing, but the psychologists were unable to handle them in
terms of the only philosophy they knew. To deny fact is
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unscientific, yet philosophical ineptitude seemed to be forcing
them to do just that. (p. 378)
Much of early Greek philosophy was concerned with the categorization
of knowledge into various classes. In fact, Greek philosophers sought to
formulate a finite number of categories or predicates (another means of
referring to such highly abstract, broadly conceived predicates is to speak
of universals) which might then be brought to bear for the purpose of
ordering the world in some logical fashion: "It was because they believed
that some such abstract predicates lent meaning to all of experience that
the Greek thinkers sought to devolve meanings 'from the universal to the
particular"' (Rychlak, 1991, p. 16).

In this regard the Greeks, and

particularly Aristotle, were successful in delineating a causal framework
capable of subsuming all things known or knowable. We turn now to a
brief examination of this framework, put forth originally by Aristotle and
employed with slight modification by Rychlak (1981). The utility of the
four-causal framework to be discussed here is found in its ability to help
clarify the grounds "for the sake of which" anything can be explained.

The Four Causes
The first of the causes employed by Aristotle is the material cause, or
"the passive receptacle on which the remaining causes act" (Bunge, 1963,
p. 32). The material cause is taken to be the literal substance which
goes to comprise anything. Thus, for example, a chair might be said to
be made of wood. It may be noted that in employing Aristotle's concept
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in this way we are not following his strict usage of the term (see Rychlak,
1988, p. 5). This is in line with the realization that we have not set out
to adopt Aristotelian philosophy en toto.
The second cause is the efficient cause, which reflects the impetus in
events.

Formulated in extraspective terms this suggests external

compulsion, or an antecedent-to-consequent flow over time in which the
former causes the latter. Thanks to the success of the natural sciences,
it is this meaning of cause that is generally most readily brought to mind

in discussions of causation (Rychlak, 1988, p. 5 ). The efficient causeeffect sequence (antecedent-to-consequent) may be contrasted with
accounts which forego this push across time.

Important to

considerations of meaning and meaning-extension, for example, is a
precedent-sequacious flow of events (to be discussed below), which
reflects a logical ordering of events sans time.
The third cause of interest is the formal cause, a patterned meaning
which may be seen as "the essence, idea, or quality of the thing
concerned" (Bunge, 1963, p. 32). The objects and patterns of the world
become "recognizable styles of this or that significance to the viewer, who
comes to know them as much by these features as by their substantial
nature (material cause) or the fact that they are assembled (efficient
cause)" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 6). It is important to recognize that in our
efforts to construct or abstract a theoretical system to account for the
world around us, our reasoning inevitably culminates in a meaningful
pattern of conceptions and designations. In fact, although no one cause
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by itself can account for all things. it may be seen that. ultimately. the
material cause mentioned above breaks down to become what we have
here called formal causality. In this sense, the material cause cannot be
taken as most "basic" to explanation (as some theorists, such as the
materialists, have claimed).

Alan Watts ( 1963) has summarized the

situation as follows:
... when the scientist investigates matter or stuff, he describes what
he finds in terms of structured pattern. When one comes to think
of it, what other terms could he use? The sensation of stuff arises
only when we are confronted with patterns so confused or so
closely knit that we cannot make them out. To the naked eye a
distant galaxy looks like a solid star and a piece of steel like a
continuous and impenetrable mass of matter. But when we
change the level of magnification, the galaxy assumes the clear
structure of a spiral nebula and the piece of steel turns out to be a
system of electrical impulses whirling in relatively vast spaces. The
idea of stuff expresses no more than the experience of coming to a
limit at which our senses or our instruments are not fine enough
to make out the pattern. (pp. 12-13, italics added)
The fourth of the causes of interest here is the final cause, which
Aristotle himself coined and made central to his physics (Rychlak, 1988,
p. 6). It was Aristotle's belief that in order to render a full account of
anything, we must state the reason or purpose "for the sake of which"
something exists or is created: "Aristotle took organic development as his
paradigm for explaining all material change, and he saw this in terms of
development toward a mature form (e.g., the adult oak tree). He was
prepared to apply this idea to the development of minerals in the ground
and to the whole cosmos" (White, 1990, p. 4). It was this unwarranted
assigning of final causes to nature, as when Aristotle proposed that
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leaves existed for the sake of shading fruit on trees, that later theorists
were to find distasteful. Rychlak (in press) has spoken of the "Baconian
criticism" in this regard:
It was Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who led the assault on such

final-cause description in science. Pointing his guns at Aristotle,
Bacon (1605/ 1952) said that it is bad scientific explanation to
suggest that leaves on trees are "for the sake of " shading fruit, or
that skeletal bones are "for the sake of' holding up the fleshy parts
of the body (p. 45 ). Since we can fully explain trees, leaves, bones,
and flesh using material and efficient causes, with the possible
addition of occasional formal causes, any such final-cause
phraseology is unnecessary. Thus, the Baconian Criticism holds
that telic description in natural science adds nothing to the
account! Bacon admitted final causation into the realm of
metaphysics. But he definitely thought it was superfluous in
physical description. (Rychlak, 1994)
In the present account we will argue that while this is true enough when
we are speaking about the inanimate objects of the world--and, perhaps,
some lower organisms as well--the value of the final-cause in accounting
for human behavior is readily demonstrated.

The Nature of Theoretical Explanation
In general, our theoretical conceptions come first, providing the
grounds upon which we subsequently base our methodological attempts
at validating our conceptions of reality. We must avoid the tendency,
however, to assume that what has been observed and recorded in the
experimental context necessarily provides a complete description
(explanation) of the phenomenon under study.

All too often the

precedent meanings framed in an experimental context are assumed to
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be the only ones capable of explaining the events observed. Unless we
keep separate our methodological descriptions and our theoretical
accounts, we are open to committing the "affirming the consequent"
fallacy, or what has also been called the "empiricist's error" (Rychlak,
1988, p. 274).

Regardless of the outcome of our well-controlled

experimental outcome, there are always, in principle, N possible
explanations for any observation. It follows from this that none of the
four causes can be effectively "ruled-out" of a theoretical account on an!!
priori basis.
As will become more apparent in the discussion to follow, there has
been a general tendency to ground or reduce explanatory accounts to
what we shall be calling mechanistic (material- and efficient-) causation.
Yet, the material and efficient cause grounds are not the only ones which
can be employed to explain the various aspects of the world. Indeed,
from the perspective of a teleological theory of mankind, they are neither
desirable nor complete.

As we shall see, though such extraspective

mechanistic accounts have proven quite helpful in the study of the
inanimate world, such conceptions leave much to be desired in the study
of the human being. Consistent with good science, much of evidence
adduced by current mechanistic theories of the person is to be used here
to provide support for a teleological conception of human behavior.

CHAPTER 2
THE FAILURE OF TELEOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

A primary concern of those studying the relationship between mood
and memory during the first portion of the twentieth century involved
explaining the methodological finding of a relatively greater ease of recall
for positive as opposed to negative memories (Singer & Salovey, 1988).
Freudian theory, with its accompanying concept of repression, seemed to
some to provide a theoretical context within which such notions might
be validated. Thus, a portion of the original work in the area of mood
and memory, viewed broadly, found its impetus in Freud's psychoanalytic
psychology.
According to Freudian theory, some memories or experiences were
intentionally, albeit unconsciously, repressed owing to the nature of
their content. Using his or her knowledge of the workings of the mind,
as well as any clues provided by the individual, the job of the
psychoanalyst was then to subtly cue the client into remembering these
repressed associations. That is, the psychoanalyst sought to look at the
patient from an introspective or "first-person" perspective, and from the
scattered fragments of the patient's recollections, cull an explanation of
present functioning: in so doing he or she sought to recreate that longforgotten emotional context, the remembrance of which would lead to
insight--and, perhaps, cure.
11

12
It would not be going too far to say that Freud conceptualized an
intentional being. Oatley ( 1988) has eloquently described the manner by
which Freud encompassed a teleological outlook:
Memory does indeed have a central place in psychoanalysis, but
the key to Freud's theorizing about it is his treatment of it as
related to human goals, wishes as he called them: how we
sometimes act as if we had an intention but deny it. Freud's
methods were methods for investigating goals and plans, by
listening to patients' stories. A story makes sense only when
the goals and plans of the actors are understood. Yes, Freud
was interested in restoring memories, but the interpretations
that psychoanalysts offer to fill gaps in a story do not fill any
old gaps. They fill specifically those gaps left by missing
intentions. They suggest goals that might have been forgotten
or denied, but which might make sense of otherwise
incomprehensible sequences of action. (p. 11)
Though he originally sought to align himself with the extraspective
meanings devolving from the primary influences of the day, including the
medical model, natural science, mathematics, and evolutionary theory
(Rychlak, 1981), Freud found himself sorely pressed to do so. In fact,
though he ultimately settled on an awkward mental energy conception
called "libido," Freud had strayed far from the theoretical conceptions of
men such as Brucke, Helmholtz, and other prominent figures of the day.
Freudian conceptions of human mental processes, including memory,
eventually fell from favor as individuals sought to examine reality in a
presumably more objective and empirical--hence extraspective--fashion.
Introspection, though considered by many of the time (e.g., Wundt,
Brentano) to be a viable method of studying the human being, was faced
with the increasing successes of the physical sciences in explaining the
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world using extraspective and non-teleological scientific theory.
According to Tageson (1982), perhaps the greatest factor in the demise of
introspection and the study of consciousness was the discovery of the
"conditioned reflex" by Ivan P. Pavlov in the early part of the twentieth
century: "Objectively induced under rigid laboratory controls,
quantifiable, publicly observable in terms of related stimuli and
responses, the conditioned reflex was seized upon as the new building
block for empirical psychology" (p. 4). The metaphysical framework of
psychology was now cast in stone.

The Lockean Paradigm
In a very real sense, the momentum of the early physical sciences in
making sense of the world was sufficient to carry its paradigmatic
conceptions fully over and into the theoretical outlook of psychology. By
affecting the foundational assumptions of this growing field, psychology's
conception of the nature of the human being--and for our purposes, the
relationship of mood I emotion and memory--was radically altered. The
result was an attempt to firmly ground theoretical explanations in terms
of material and efficient causation, then seen as most basic in nature.
Sherif ( 1992) has commented on this occurrence as follows:
Undeniably, the prestigious and successful sciences in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century were those securely focused
on the physical world and the physical processes of the organic
world. Psychologists, in their strivings to gain status with other
scientists, did not pause long on issues raised by the differences
between studying a rock, a chemical compound, or an animal, on
the one hand, and a human individual, on the other. Instead,
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methods that had been successful in the physical and biological
sciences were embraced as models for psychology. Researchers
were soon deep into analogy, comparing the human individual to
the chemical compound or to the animal as the subject of
research, with all of the power that such an analogy gives to the
scientific investigator. at least if the animal is captive and small.
Unlike the natural scientist, however, the psychologists had only
social power over the research subject, not the greater power to
explore, observe, and analyze that had unlocked so many of
nature's secrets for the physical sciences. (p. 115)
Though this exclusively extraspective stance is perhaps not surprising,
given the historical antecedents, its legacy has been a progression of
mechanical or machine accounts--to the exclusion of teleological
accounts such as the one to be offered below.
It was perhaps the British empiricist tradition which did the most to

contribute to the formation of models of learning and development which
presumed that the origin of knowledge could be traced back to the sense
organs. There was much carryover from the British Empiricist position
to the growing behavioral paradigm in the United States:
[British Empiricism] has a certain aesthetic appeal and has been
the typical choice of the tough-minded theorist. Most behavioral
scientists have considered the British Empiricist position to be the
more "scientific" position. Thus, when American psychology shifted
to Behaviorism, there was a drastic shift in the subject matter of
psychology (from phenomenal experience to behavior), but no
change in each of the assumptions outlined above. On these
fundamental issues stimulus-response psychology was in total
agreement with British Empiricism. (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984: p.
98)
The position thus taken delineated a tabula rasa intellect, or what was
defined by Popper (1972) as "the bucket theory of the mind." In other
words, the mind is considered to be an empty or almost empty container
into which "information" procured through the senses is accumulated
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and later assimilated.
Such a portrayal pointed back to the naive realism of John Locke
(1632-1704), an important figure in our understanding of the historical
antecedents of what we take to be the contemporruy opposing theories to
be discussed in this paper. Such models shall henceforth be spoken of
as Lockean conceptions. It was Locke who spoke of the mind as existing
along the lines of an empty cabinet, into which experience deposits
sensory datum in linear fashion. Locke, who aligned himself with the
British Empiricists and thus against nativistic thinking, noted that "if
truth is native to the human mind, it is useless to search for it outside
of the mind by observation and experimentation" (Jacobson, 1982). He
appealed for scientists and thinkers to examine the world external to
themselves in order to discover the true source from which all ideas
originated.
Locke's philosophy held several basic tenets with regard to the human
being. First of all, as is perhaps already clear, all knowledge was seen as
being derived from the environment. Thus, it followed that the mind was
composed of simple elements, elements which had been input, as into
the cabinet mentioned above. And, according to the Lockean perspective,
the fundamental mechanisms of learning are associationistic, relying
therefore upon frequency and temporal contiguity. One consequence of
these considerations was that the human being was seen as a mere
bystander, the passive recipient of signals/elements arising from the
environment. Indeed, what we have here is a precursor to the notion of
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the "black box" which was to become prominent during the reign of
behavioral psychology in the United States. Locke felt that all things,
human beings included, could be best explained (that is, in accord with
the Baconian criticism, with the least "theoretical baggage") in a
demonstrative fashion:
How comes [the mind] to be furnished? Whence comes it by
that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has
painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all
the materials of reason and knowledge? [italics in original] To
this I answer, in one word, from experience [italics added]. In
that all our knowledge is founded: and from that it ultimately
derives itself. (Jacobson, 1982, p. 10)
Accordingly, meaning for Locke arises only as a sign, activated by the
senses to represent the relations between successions of events. This is
to say that we as human beings are born without "content" (without
Platonic forms), and that as we grow older and receive more and more
input from the environment, our behavior subsequently becomes more
and more complex (in additive fashion). The Lockean conception of the
human being was thus very much an extraspective account, as it viewed
all meaning as arising outside of the individual. Rather than the outer
world being meaningfully construed by the human being beginning at
birth (a top-down process), all meaning arrives as input at whatever time
the individual serendipitously comes into contact with various aspects of
his or her world (a bottom-up process). Rather than viewing behavior
from the perspective of a person who behaves "for the sake of' some goal,
the account shifted explanation to those forces in the environment
which pushed the hapless individual from state to state in an efficient
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cause manner.
An important consequence of the Lockean conception was the notion

that all ideas were input from the environment over time. Thus, for the
newborn to come to know any aspect of the world, he or she would have
to exist in it for some indeterminate period, thereby inputting stores of
information as he or she bumped and scraped along a narrow reality
consisting mostly or entirely of the immediately sensible environment.
Locke spoke of the newborn infant as follows:
He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first
coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored
with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future
knowledge. It is by degrees that he comes to be furnished with
them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities
imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of
time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities
come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the
beginning of their acquaintance with them. [italics in original]
(Taylor, 1961, p. 11)
Thus, concepts like "mama" came to have meaning after being associated
contiguously over repeated occurrences with positive and negative
encounters. In this manner concepts like "good" and "bad" were also
learned.

Rather than being seen as two elements unified under one

context in oppositional fashion (hence lending meaning one to the
other), such evaluative notions were considered apposites--no more
related to one another than concepts such as grass and concrete. Below
we shall have more to say about the ideas of John Locke, ideas which
were picked up by scientists eager to carry forward the empirical torch of
knowledge. With alacrity and zeal, a great majority of thinkers since
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Locke have adopted and then furthered the assumption that theo:iy poses
more of a barrier to scientific knowledge than a means of attaining it.

CHAPTER3
A KANTIAN ALTERNATNE: LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY (LLT)

The contemporary "problem" confronting the Logical Learning Theory
advocate is this: spurred on by the successes of the natural sciences
(e.g., physics, biology, etc.) in discovering relationships among the
constituents of the outer world, contemporary psychology seems to have
largely adopted a machine metaphor for explaining human behavior. As
the so-called "natural" sciences relied upon extraspective observation of
events, it seen;:ied plausible to look at the human being in this same
extraspective and "empirical" fashion. Indeed, this appeared to many to
be the most parsimonious means of explanation. However, significant
portions of this thinking, which has provided the underpinnings for
much of the theorizing in the field of psychology, are being rendered
obsolete by contemporary understanding of the human being. Thus,
much of what is to be presented here will serve to elucidate by way of
contrast the position espoused by Logical Learning Theory, as against
this machine metaphor. The goal is to render a cogent account of the
need for a revision in contemporary thinking about the human being. It
is hoped that from an explication of such problems as arise from what
we have been calling the Lockean perspective, the tenets of LLT will
follow smoothly, logically, and, perhaps, even necessarily.
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The Nature of Co~nition
In contrast to the mechanistic images of man examined above,
Rychlak (1986) has proposed a teleological conception of the human
being which he calls Logical Learning Theory (LLT). A teleological theory
holds that the item under description, for our purposes the human
being, intentionally chooses among alternatives before opting for any
course of behavior. A framework of this sort entails the formulation of a
more active and therefore introspective account of cognition, one in
which "free-will" need not be reduced to or "explained away" as mere
mechanism.

Underwriting the LLT conceptualizations of the human

being are formal- and final-cause constructs which, in contrast to the
material- and efficient-cause constructs which underlie the great
majority of contemporary cognitive theories, allow for a true freely-willing
organism. Though not employing Kantian philosophy per se, LLT draws
extensively from Kant's work in order to frame an intentional organism.
It was Kant who argued that the mind imposes a "structure" on the

world, in a priori fashion. Thus, any truths
derive their necessary character from the inherent structure of our
minds, from the natural and inevitable manner in which our
minds must operate. For the mind of man (and here at last is the
great thesis of Kant) is not passive wax upon which experience and
sensation write their absolute and yet whimsical will; nor is it a
mere abstract name for the series or group of mental states; it is
an active organ which moulds and coordinates sensations into
ideas, an organ which transforms the chaotic multiplicity of
experience into the ordered unity of thought. (Durant, 1926, p.
291)
The perspective offered by Rychlak may be said to be a predicational,
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rather than mediational, account. Predication is here to be understood
as an act of affirming, denying, or qualifying precedently broader patterns
of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning
(Rychlak, 1986).

A key feature of LLT is a belief that some of the

meanings confronted by the individual are dual, such that they present
the person qua conceptualizer with two or more alternatives in any act of
cognition.

Such an account meets what is here taken to be the

requirement of showing how it is possible for the human being to frame
alternatives in an act of cognition, choose from among these, and then
behave for the sake of such premises or affirmations. The presence of
such alternatives, arising naturally via a dialectical (or oppositional)
reasoning capacity, necessitates the rendering of a predication
(affirmation, choice, etc.), and hence opens the way for a teleological
account.

Theory of Leamin"
The key to a teleological theory is meaning, as understood
introspectively by the individual under consideration. Meaning therefore
arises not from pre-patterned wholes input from the environment as
suggested by John Locke, but rather from the meaningful affirmations
"for the sake of which" the individual comes to understand and act upon
the world. Thus, stimulus inputs from the environment are not taken in
and stored as such, but rather must be rendered significant by the
person concerned. The ability to predicate is innate, so that we do not
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learn to predicate, but rather predicate in order to learn. Further, the
passage of time, so necessary to mechanistic accounts of learning, is
superfluous to the account of LLT, relying as it does on a principle of
meaning-extension.
From the LLT perspective, cognition itself is an ordered sequence of
patterned meaning, flowing from the broader to the narrower realms of
understanding (Rychlak, 1986, p. 740).

Such a process involves

predication, and necessarily makes use of formal- and final-causation in
accounting for the flow of human mentation (Rychlak, 1986). That is, in
order to understand the behavior of another, we must see this individual
as he or she introspectively frames (patterns, renders meaningful) some
aspect of the world, and then acts "for the sake of' this affirmation
(predication) in moving towards a desired end.
In order to escape the problems posed by mechanistic explanations,
LLT looks to the tautology as a fundamental aspect of the principle of
meaning-extension. A tautology, from this perspective, is
... a patterned relationship of identity between items (things, words,
outlines, arguments, numerical values, shapes, etc.): this
relationship is not created by antecedents thrusting consequents
along, but obtains when the patterns related meaningfully fall into
line as 'more or less' identical. (Rychlak, 1984, p. 400)
Tautology is commonly understood from an extraspective perspective as
mere repetition. However, when seen from an introspective perspective,
tautology becomes a fundamental aspect of the predicational process, by
which "known" or predicated meanings (contents) are sequaciously
extended (via a telosponsive process: see below) to other so-called

23
"targets" of meaning. Partial tautology can be seen in both analogy and
disanalogy, from which follow also such notions as metaphor, allusion,
etc. By way of example, metaphor occurs when a figure of speech that
ordinarily designates an item or idea is used to designate a dissimilar
object or idea for the purpose of suggesting a comparison or analogy, as
when one speaks of the "evening of life." Such extensions of meaning
can be logical or illogical, of course, and LLT seeks to explain both
rational and irrational thoughts and behaviors via this broad-ranging
process.
In light of the trap set by much of the common nomenclature of
psychology, a term was needed to replace the traditional response
conceptions mentioned above. To meet such a need, Rychlak (in press)
has formulated the concept of telosponsivity, defined as follows:
A telosponse is the affirmation or taking of a position regarding a
meaningful content (image[s], word[s], judgmental comparison[s],
etc.) relating to a referent acting as a purpose for the sake of which
behavior is then intended. Affirmation encompasses predication.
The predication, or predicate meaning, is the content of the predicational
process, and is extended, either in whole or in part, via the person's
ability to tautologize.

Such conceptualizations are anchored at the

protopoint, or the point of meaning-extension at which the affirmation
is made. As suggested earlier, this is a necessary part of any cognitive
act, because the dialectical (oppositional) reasoning capacity of the
individual provides alternatives in each life event. Opportunities in life
are not "out there" in the external world so much as they are "in here,"
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framed within the cognizance of the person in question. We shall see
below that dialectical contrasts, consisting as they do of an intrinsic
relational tie (rather than an extrinsic relational tie), are often of an
evaluative nature.

That is, in contrast to demonstrative (Lockean)

formulations, which concentrate more or less upon quantitative
relations, dialectical relations take as their primary (though not
exclusive) focus the qualitative aspects of lived experience. Computers,
which reason exclusively in demonstrative fashion, are not capable of
consciousness. Human consciousness, on the other hand, which always
presents the individual with contrasting implications in experience,
arises precisely because of the need to "take a position."

Protopoint Affirmation and Memory
Above we noted that the affirmation in telosponsivity is made at a
protopoint. at which time that meaning is framed which will be extended
tautologically into ongoing cognition. The logical ordering here is from a
precedent meaning to its sequacious (i.e., necessary) extension. A
fundamental premise of LLT is that the meanings framed in the
telosponsive process extend necessarily once they have been affirmed as
relevant to the circumstances facing the individual.

Prior to this

affirmation the meaning or meanings may be countered by uncertainties,
ambivalences, and the like.

The research literature in the field of

psychology has reflected precedent-sequacious meaning-extensions in
such various notions as inference, attribution, implication, impression

25
formation, induction, and deduction (Rychlak, 1994). We now turn to
some of the many examples of predication and telosponsivity to be found
in psychology.
Turning back to the short-lived Wurzburg School of Imageless
Thought, established just after the turn of this century, we find
precedent-sequacious meaning extension in such concepts as "aufgabe"
and "einstellung." The aufgabe, or the experimenter's predication via
task instruction, could be seen to establish a precedent einstellung
(predicating bias) for the subject under study, a bias which was then
extended sequaciously into the findings of the ongoing experiment. Asch
(1946), in an early study examining impression-formation, found that if
subjects were told that a person was "intelligent, industrious, impulsive,
critical, stubborn, and envious" they were predisposed to evaluate this
individual more positively than if the same characteristics were conveyed
in the opposite order.

The initial affirmation of the individual as

intelligent appears to have framed a precedent set (einstellung) that
extended sequaciously into the ongoing impression in the face of some
contrasting evidence, which seems then to have been re-predicated in
terms of this more positive protopoint affirmation (Asch, 1946, p. 69).
The importance of the manner in which experience is predicated is
also well demonstrated by the work of Sperling ( 1960), in his
investigations of sensory memory. In his earlier research, Sperling had
subjects view an array of letters which were presented for brief periods of
time. They were then asked to recall as many of the letters they had seen

26

as possible.

Sperling found that no matter how many letters were

presented, subjects were limited in their recall to four or five letters using
this whole report procedure. He then used a partial report procedure
which asked subjects to recall only a portion of the array of letters (a
single group of letters in either a row or column). Using a tone, subjects
were cued regarding which row or column was to be recalled.
Interestingly, Sperling found that subjects could recall any row or
column virtually without error, even when the tone was presented up to
300 milliseconds after the termination of the visual display. Clearly, the
entire array was available for recall by the subjects.

But what they

would or could recall was not stimulus bound. While critics might argue
that the subjects' retention was "determined" by the experimenter, upon
reflection we might see that it is only because the subjects' themselves
consented to the procedure that the results came out in the pattern of
interest. Given an unwillingness to follow the procedures outlined by
the experimenter (the "aufgabe"), subjects might easily have predicated
the task differently ("einstellung"), leading to other than the anticipated
results (See Page, 1972, who found examples of subjects who did not
conform to a response-reinforcement contingency, despite clearly
understanding the experimental expectations).
Another example of the importance of the manner in which the task
is predicated is provided by the work of Pichert and Anderson ( 1977). In
a series of experiments, these researchers had subjects alter the
perspective from which they read and then recalled a story.

In one
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instance, they had readers adopt the perspective of either a homebuyer or
a burglar when attempting to recall information associated with a house.
They found that subjects who, for example, had adopted the perspective
of a burglar were more likely to recall having seen a color television,
while subjects who had adopted the homebuyer stance were more likely
to recall information about a leak in the roof.

The point is that the

recall of material was not caused in mechanical (material- and efficientcause) fashion, either by the sensory stimulus, or the instructions of the
experimenter.

The recall observed reflected the subjects' unique

predication of the task ("aufgabe") at hand.

Logical Learning Theory

would argue that though such examples of precedent-sequacious
meaning-extension are legion in the everyday activities of all individuals,
the fact that they are often clothed in mechanistic garb renders them
difficult (or impossible) to see.
One area of particular difficulty for traditional mechanistic theories
of learning occurs in cases similar to those just mentioned, but in which
oppositionality is involved. We have thus far been mostly concerned
with the "inside" of a Euler circle arrangement (circles within circles, we
might say) as meaning is extended from the broader to the narrower
realm of understanding. But as has been suggested above, we have also
to consider the "outside" of this logical arrangement. According to LLT,
the intrinsic relational tie of inside to outside should facilitate memory
performance under some circumstances. Schema theory predicts that
what is familiar (in the sense of having been encountered repeatedly) is
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what will be ingrained in mind, hence remembered. The schema is the
inside of our Euler circle arrangement, and its meaning is extended to
some target. But the advantage to be gained in having familiarity {in LLT
terms, a meaningful predicating framework) with some item or experience
extends beyond this, to include the effects of contrast and/ or negation
on memory.
In an experiment by Hastie and Kumar ( 1979), for example, subjects
were given trait descriptions establishing a target person as "honest."
This was done in order to have subjects formulate a particular schema of
this individual. Subjects were then given information which was either
consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant to the question of the target
individual's honesty. It was found that subjects recalled significantly
more inconsistent information than consistent or irrelevant data.

A

similar finding occurred when Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, and
Dougherty ( 1989) had subjects study the layout and contents of either an
office or a preschool classroom and then recall what they had seen.
Within each of these settings, some subjects saw items inconsistent with
what their "schemas" would lead them to expect (for example, an ashtray
in a preschool classroom). At recall, subjects were once again found to
recall significantly more items inconsistent with the setting than items
consistent with it. This occurs because contrast and negation are a part
of every predication, so that even inconsistent or unexpected information
contributes meaningfully to what is being framed.
The notion that meaning is extended from a "broader" realm of
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meaning to a "narrower" realm of meaning leads us to expect other
specifiable patterns of results in the area of memory research; more
specifically, in the area that we may call "predicate cueing" (Rychlak,
1994). For example, if the sentence "A pan can be used as a drum" has
been seen before but is presently "forgotten," cueing the subject with
either the word "pan" or "drum" will be seen to improve memory over
what it would otherwise be (Rychlak, 1994).

However, from the LLT

perspective a further distinction is possible, in that we would expect a
greater facilitation to occur with the cue "drum" than with the cue "pan."
This relates to our principle of meaning-extension, wherein a broader
expanse of knowledge or meaning (here, the broader predicate meaning)
is brought to bear conceptually "onto" a narrower or more focused target.
In order to demonstrate such cueing effects, while showing that such
effects are not simply the result of linguistic conventions, Stilson ( 1988)
gave subjects word triplets, each consisting of three words. Within each
triplet, one word was broader in meaning (relative to the other two
words), and therefore capable of sequaciously extending meaning to the
'

remaining words. So, for example, if given the triplet "nose, face, smile,"
the word "face" would be most likely to be employed as the predicate
meaning. Given that a subject has read this triplet, but now cannot
bring it to mind, do we expect a greater facilitation from the use of "face"
as a cue, one of the other two possible words, or should it not make any
difference? According to traditional cognitive psychological theories, this
should not make any difference, since ease of recall is presumed to be
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based on frequency and contiguity measures. However, according to LLT,
since "face" is capable of subsuming and hence lending meaning to both
"smile" and "nose," we would expect a greater facilitation from the cueing
of this term. This is what was found. Although cueing subjects with any
of the three relevant words aided memory, the greatest facilitation was
shown with words judged to be broader in context meaning.
In the ways mentioned above, we see the importance of what the
subject "brings to bear" both inside and outside of the experimental
context. We next turn to a consideration of "affection," which LLT takes
to be the most "basic" precedent dimension utilized to frame experience.

A Basic Dimension on which to Build
As stated above, LLT is based on conceptions which allow for a freelywilling organism.

As a first step toward the formulation of such a

teleological conception of the human being, there began a search for a
cognitive process which could not itself be reduced to traditional
mechanistic explanations of learning (Rychlak, 1988).

Such a

conception would need to be capable of demonstrating a unique and
unlearned contribution of the individual to the process of knowledge
acquisition. We said above that an individual must essentially "know"
in order to "know." But we have already rejected the idea of inherited
mental ideas or "contents." If the individual is not born with innate
contents, then how is it possible for the individual to extend a first
predicating meaning?

The realm of affection offered some hope of
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formulating such a construct.
Based upon our dialectical account of human reason, the term
affective assessment was chosen to denote the unique contribution of
the individual to his or her thought processes. A purely cognitive act,
affective assessment referred to the ability of the individual to sort
(organize) the varying contents of the world (including literally anything
known or knowable) along a bipolar dimension of like-dislike. Affection
is involves, not activation, but predication. Such a capacity is made
possible by transcending telosponsivity, or the innate capacity of the
individual to "step back" and reflexively construe (i.e., evaluate) the
meanings of his or her predications (cognitions). In so doing, the person
characterizes all such meaningful contents as either liked (positive
evaluation) or disliked (negative evaluation) in quality.
This affective conception is taken to be the broadest possible frame of
reference by which an individual may sort the varying aspects of his or
her world. One benefit of an idiographic conception such as affective
assessment is that it allows for an examination and explanation of
behaviors dating back to the very earliest days of life, as the newborn
infant begins ordering and rendering cogent various aspects of the reality
with which he or she is faced.
The assumption made by LLT advocates in this research is that socalled stimulus inputs or encodings of experience are not simply
'recorded' conceptually as given, but that they must be predicated
in the process of telosponsivity. In having to frame precedents of
experience--and especially of highly unique experience, as in the
task faced by infants--the dialectically reasoning human being falls
back on the broadest possible meaningfulness to accomplish the
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conceptual task. There is no broader range of meaning than a
person's unique preferences, his or her 'likes' and 'dislikes' which
can frame all possible experience as a kind of preferential
predicate." (Rychlak, 1986, p. 746)
For our purposes, the importance of this conception lies in its essential
tie to LLT assertions regarding both mood and memory, to which we now
turn.

Research on Affective Assessment
The concept of affective assessment is underwritten by the construct
of telosponsivity, and is operationalized by asking subjects to render a
judgment of "like versus dislike" in regard to some item in experience. In
having the subject render such a judgment, we assume that the
individual can meaningfully frame items such as pictures, faces, words,
etc., along this bipolar dimension of "likability."

An item thus

considered becomes a "that for the sake of which" an evaluation
(affective assessment) is rendered. Once such an evaluation has been
made, the individual is likely to carry out the steps necessary to further
his or her purposes, for as Rychlak (in press) states: "Affection orients
the person to the future through choice."
In the methodological context, subjects' telosponses are recorded on a
four-point bipolar scale which ranges from "like much" and "like
slightly," to "dislike slightly" and "dislike much."

This provides a

dialectical context within which is situated the individual's judgment. A
variant, albeit congruent, way of thinking about the dimension of
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affective assessment is to bring to mind the differences between the
denotative and connotative meanings of any word.

The denotative

meaning of a word is that which can be sought in any dictionary. The
connotative meaning, on the other hand, reflects a more individual
assessment of the value of a word or concept for conveying an intended
meaning.

Findin~s

on positive affection. Though originally understood in

biological and mechanical (material- and efficient-cause) terms, there
were suggestions in the extant literature that something like affective
assessment was to be seen in human learning (Rychlak, 1981). Tait
(1913), for example, had subjects rate a series of colors for pleasantness
and unpleasantness and then measured their reaction time using a color
recognition test. The findings indicated that subjects performed better
on those items which they had rated as pleasant. Fluegel ( 191 7, 1925)
had subjects keep a diary for a period of one month, during which time
they recorded the duration, intensity, and quality of their experiences.
Once again, the findings showed subjects listing more pleasant than
unpleasant experiences.

Though much of this early research was

criticized on methodological and interpretational grounds (Singer &
Salovey, 1988), the general finding of a learning superiority of pleasant
over unpleasant and indifferent words continued to show through in
most such studies (Rychlak, 1981 ).
From the very beginnings of his work in this area, Rychlak ( 1966)
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found that college students learned their liked

eve trigrams more readily

than their disliked trigrams. Matlin and Stang ( 1978) were subsequently
to call this effect the "Pollyanna principle."

Unfortunately, their

explanation of this phenomenon fell back upon a positive reinforcement
notion, in which the individual would form stronger associative bonds
between the liked items to be learned and other liked information in
memory based on mere exposure to the material. Similarly, it might be
suggested that the learner expended more energy memorizing a positive
item than a negative item, with a consequent stronger associative
bonding hence better memory for the former than the latter. Thus, the
meaningfulness of the material was determined externally "for" the
person, who passively mediated such input and output relationships.
This thinking is, of course, not consistent with LLT premises of how
human mentation "works."
In order to expand upon the premises ofLLT, a great deal of work was
carried out in this area. The pattern results showing a facilitation for
positive affection was extended to work involving colors and personal
experiences, and in the learning of words (Andrews, 1972), abstract
designs (McFarland, 1969), and names-to-faces (Galster, 1972). As the
earlier research on pleasantness had suggested, subjects learned their
liked trigrams more readily than their disliked trigrams. This robust
finding obtained whether the experiments employed mixed lists (i.e., both
liked and disliked trigrams included) or unmixed lists (i.e., either all
liked or all disliked trigrams included) in paired-associates and serial
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learning formats, and whether the rate of learning was tested using
trials-to-criterion, recognition, or free recall (Abramson,

1967;

Laberteaux, 1968; Rychlak, 1966).
After having subjects prerate their study topics in an introductory
psychology course, Slife and Rychlak ( 1981) found that students did
better on those subjects they rated positively (liked) than those they did
not (disliked). Similarly, underachievers typically learn what they like
dramatically better than what they dislike, while those individuals who
might be characterized as overachievers seem not to have great difficulty
with this factor; that is, they perform well with both sorts of materials
(Rychlak & Tobin, 1971). Subjects have been found to correctly identify
"good" (liked) words at a shorter tachistoscopic exposure rate than "bad"
(disliked) words (Johnson, Thomson, & Frtncke, 1960).
Researchers have also found the effects of positive affection extending
beyond the context of learning (i.e., memorizing, recalling). Adults who
predicate themselves and the world around them positively tend to see
themselves as causes of positive outcomes to a greater extent than they
perceive themselves as causes of negative outcomes (Mirels, 1980;
Sherman, 1980). Lott and Lott (1970) found that children who drew a
picture of a liked peer gave it more detail than a drawing of a peer whom
they disliked. Children with a favorable affective (positive or "happy")
outlook may be seen to extend help to others to a greater extent than
children with an unfavorable affective (negative or "unhappy") outlook
(Strayer, 1980).
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Another area of interest and relevance for the present study concerns
what are known as "transfer" effects in learning. In the area of affective
assessment, it has been found that there is a dramatic order-effect when
subjects are given successive unmixed lists of either positive or negative
materials (e.g., trigrams, words) to be learned. For example, in one study
all 32 subjects moving from a disliked to a liked list manifest
improvement in performance on the second list, while only 13 of the 32
subjects reflected such improvement when moving from liked to disliked
lists (Rychlak & Tobin, 1971). This is known as positive nonspecific
transfer. It is "nonspecific" because the two lists of materials to be
learned did not share any features in common. In order to extend these
findings by showing that such results are not a consequence of linguistic
considerations, Rychlak, Tuan, and Schneider (1974) contrasted
association value (AV) with affection across lists of learnable items.
They found that moving from lists high in meaningfulness to lists low in
meaningfulness (and vice versa) did not effect transfer, whereas in
moving from a disliked to a liked list subjects once again showed
significantly greater improvement. Rychlak (in press) has pointed to the
work of Premack (1965, 1971) as having relevance here also. Premack
found that individuals will perform a disliked activity in order to then be
able to engage in a liked activity. Similarly, Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler,
and Schilling (1989) report that the termination of a stressful event (by
definition an affectively negative occurrence) tends to leave people in
better moods than if these events had not occurred. Such studies, which
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essentially reproduce the disliked-to-liked ordering of the first study
mentioned above, add support to the notion of a general positive
nonspecific transfer. In LLT terms, the move facilitates the learning of
"normal" individuals, who employ their personal evaluative preferences to
frame a context of meaning in which positive or "liked" meanings are
more readily extended to the task at hand than negative or "disliked"
meanings.

In the process of telosponding the individual tautologtzes

from his or her ongoing understanding (evaluative preference) "to" the
situation at hand.

Findings on negative affection.

The LLT concept of affective

assessment posited more than just a facilitation in the learning of liked
items.

If affection provides a broader context within which the

individual situates his or her life experiences, it should also follow that
individuals who predicate themselves, the task at hand, or materials
involved in the task at hand negatively, might learn their disliked
materials more readily than their liked materials. This follows from the
nature of sequacious meaning-extension: negativity creates and/ or
facilitates the extension of negative meanings, just as we saw above that
positivity creates and/or facilitates the extension of positive meanings.
Affection serves as a potent conceptual organizer of this nature.
The relationship between affective learning style and ease of learning
is dependent upon a combination of factors which, together, determine
the facilitation or seeming inhibition of learning. Rychlak has carried
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out numerous studies designed to demonstrate the effects of precisely
these factors. This work sought to examine not only "normal" subjects,
who might be expected to predicate the world in a more or less positive
fashion, but also individuals who might be expected to predicate in a
negative fashion. Among other things, Rychlak and others showed that
adult patients given diagnoses such as schizophrenia, depression, and
alcoholism, collapsed or even reversed the learning superiority for
positively assessed items in the direction of favoring negative items
(Mosbacher, 1984; Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971; Slife,
Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984). These findings were extended also
to elementary, high school, and college students with negative selfimages (August & Rychlak, 1978; August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975;
Rychlak, Carlsen, & Dunning, 1974), and high school students who were
forced to perform a learning task that they disliked (Rychlak & Marcell,
1986, 1992).
Again, not all subjects display significantly better performance for
disliked than liked materials. In some cases the difference between the
liked and disliked items is attenuated, with the result that there is no
longer a significant advantage for the former items. This came to be
known as a diminution of the ordinary "positive" effect.

Others do,

however, achieve a reversal, meaning that they learn significantly more
disliked than liked items (August & Rychlak, 1978). In some cases, one
gender subgroup in a sample might achieve a reversal, whereas the other
would simply reflect a diminution (August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975;
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Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971). In a study on high
school students which crossed the factors of high or low self-image with
ratings of "liking" or "disliking," an enforced paired-associates learning
task was performed. The results indicated that although neither of these
factors was by itself sufficient to achieve a reversal, when subjects were
negative in self-image and forced to perform a disliked learning task, they
did indeed learn significantly more disliked than liked

eve (consonant-

vowel-consonant} trigrams (Rychlak & Marcell, 1992).
It is important to emphasize that we are not dealing with some form
of generalized "activation" here, so that even persons with primarily
positive self-images will, in some cases, learn along the negative more
readily than the positive. We must consider an individual's affirmed
premises regarding his or her own areas of strength and weakness; that
is, take into account the broader affective predication (positive or
negative} which is brought to bear in understanding liked or disliked
items of experience.

To examine this issue, Rychlak, Carlsen, and

Dunning (1974) had college subjects specify a positive and a negative
realm of life activity.

For example, some subjects rated "aggressively

competing with others" as a liked activity, whereas "becoming passively
intimate with others" represented a more stressful (disliked} activity.
Other subjects were found who displayed an opposite preference: these
subjects rated "aggressively competing with others" as a disliked activity,
and "becoming passively intimate with others" a liked activity. Words
were then found to represent each of these domains.

In the area of
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competitiveness, such words as "incentive," "decisive," "demanding," and
"excelling" were employed, while words such as "sympathy," "pamper,"
"reverence," and "accepting" were utilized to denote passive-intimacy.
Subjects rated these words along the dimension of affective assessment.
As predicted, subjects learned according to the positive affective
assessment effect within their liked realm, but showed a reverse tendency
within their disliked realm.
Finally, we find that this affective dimension is ubiquitous. For even
the manner in which a therapist predicates (positively or negatively) the
therapeutic situation is also quite important. This was demonstrated in
a study of countertransference (Heiskell & Rychlak, 1986). Male medical
students were used as subjects, playing the role of "psychotherapists."
Male VA patients were used in the role of "therapy client." First, the
veterans were videotaped while giving general information about
themselves (such things as background, schooling, work history, etc.).
Next, the veterans were asked to discuss two specific life concerns, one of
a very positive nature and one of a very negative nature (e.g., job success
versus sexual inadequacies). Then, in a pretest, and based on their more
general comments, the medical students made RV (like-dislike) ratings of
the patients. Each medical student was next asked to react verbally to a
positive and negative videotaped statement made by a liked and a
disliked patient, while acting as if he were in a therapeutic interview with
each patient. These verbal statements were electronically recorded and
later scored for empathy by judges who were unfamiliar with the medical
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student's RV preferences.

It was found that the medical students

reflected the greatest empathy in their statements when they were
responding to the positive life concerns of their liked veterans--but also
to the negative statements of their disliked veterans. Thus, we see the
rendering of affective judgments to be important on both sides of the
therapeutic equation.
According to Logical Learning Theory (LLT), learning occurs not
through the frequency of repetitions of an item over time or when two
items occur in close proximity to one another, but rather when a
person's precedent premises sequaciously order, and hence meaningfully
conceptualize whatever task or material is at hand. If the individual's
frame of reference is unable to make sense of experience, no learning will
take place. Frequency and contiguity measures such as time on task,
practice, and rehearsal are all viewed as being of secondary importance,
useful more to referentially track the items of experience than as
principles of explanation (Rychlak, 1986).

The Relationship of Mood and Memory in LLT
According to Logical Learning Theory, affective assessment is a
"cognitive" (predicational) process, and as such is not to be confused
with emotion.

The latter entity is conceptualized as a physical

occurrence, more as something which happens "to" one in life's varying
circumstances. Logical Learning Theory (LLT) defines emotion as follows:
Emotion refers to the pattern of physiological feelings in a certain
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life situation, the sum total of which is targeted and thereby
organized into meaning by the predications of the person
experiencing these feelings and living through the circumstances of
the situation involved. Emotions are not telosponses. They are
not arbitrarily generated by oppositionality, but occur in
unidirectional fashion as do all biological and physical
circumstances in experience. Emotional feelings can be stimulated
by certain drugs, or by having the person recall an emotionally
upsetting life circumstance. (Rychlak, 1994)
That the two are distinct is suggested by the fact that the same emotion
can be judged both liked and disliked, depending upon the context in
which this judgment is made. Perhaps the best example of this involves
anger.

While this emotion can be a hindrance in one context, as for

example when tiying to deal fairly with a disliked other, it can also be
utilized to bring about positive ends, as when an individual with a
traditional lack of will musters the courage to confront another by whom
he or she feels slighted.
The definition of emotion given above is designed to apply across the
varying ways in which emotions might be said to function.

In other

words, whether emotions are the result of precedent cognitive appraisals,
or are seen as conscious efforts to render meaningful some pattern of
already occurring bodily reactions, the individual must make a unique
contribution to the ongoing experience. Because of this requirement for
active "participation" (predication) on the part of the person involved,
one cannot "pretend" that something is liked when it is not, and thereby
hope to sequaciously extend congruent meaning.

Similarly, the

intention to manufacture a genuine emotion cannot be fulfilled simply
through an intention to "have it." As Rychlak (in press) has noted, in
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order to capture an emotional mood we must place ourselves back into a
situation that we have already experienced, during which time the
emotion "came upon us:" "Just as inanimate physical events intrude on
our behavior--as when we are suddenly caught in a cold downpour of
rain--so too do biological intrusions occur as the person is swamped by a
strange sensation during a life circumstance" (Rychlak, 1994, p. 135).
Another characteristic of the distinction between affection (affective
assessment) and emotion is that although these processes (Logos-Bios)
can be congruent, they can at times also bear an oppositional
relationship to one another. As William James (1948) noted long ago:
The associationists may prate of an idea of pleasure being a
pleasant idea, of an idea of pain being a painful one, but the
unsophisticated sense of mankind is against them, agreeing with
Homer that the memory of griefs when past may be a joy, and with
Dante that there is no greater sorrow than, in misery, to recollect
one's happier time. (p. 248)
This does not mean, however, that once we are "down" we are
constrained to experience this mood indefinitely, or until such time as
our "state" of "activation" subsides. As Rychlak (in press) has suggested:
"An unpleasant circumstance, once meaningfully framed, often teaches
us to do what is necessary to make it pleasant. The concept of emotion
does not include such directional suggestions .... Based on the intrinsic
oppositionality of affection such a strategy is readily suggested" (p. 55).
Thus, for example, the individual who is feeling unhappy or depressed
can reason to the opposite of what is presently the case and conclude
that by visiting a liked friend or reading a liked book, an "elevation" of
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mood may be brought about.
Much as the evaluation of an emotion or emotional experience is
dependent upon the evaluation rendered by the individual, the same is
true of "moods." Moods, which Morris (1989} describes as being both
"pervasive" and "global," extend their meanings similarly, in precedentsequacious fashion. As we shall see, research on mood has shown that
how people predicate a circumstance influences what they will recall,
learn, or produce as an evaluation in subsequent events. If this is indeed
the case, we might then expect that pleasant moods would facilitate the
recall of such things as pleasant life situations or previously learned
positive word meanings, while the reverse might hold true for those
aspects of the world which are predicated negatively. Findings of this
sort would be consistent with the precedent-sequacious style of
explanation which is essential to LLT (indeed, such findings are taken up
in later sections}. A "mood" is clearly a context meaning which must be
predicated by the person involved: and once affirmed, its meaning
extends to what is then under continuing cognitive formulation
("processing"} (Rychlak, 1994}. Moods, which LLT takes to represent
affective assessments, may subtly insinuate themselves into our ongoing
awareness, thereby playing a role in determining what we remember
(reconceptualize} from the past, as well as perceive in the present. If this
is the case, then we would expect to see research findings in the mood
and memory literature which are similar to the findings mentioned above
(e.g., persons who predicate themselves positively might be expected to
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learn liked materials more readily than those who dislike themselves,
etc.).
As we have said, affection acts as a significant conceptual heuristic
to facilitate the learning of the individual. That is, affection may serve
as a wider "context" or predicate meaning which can be extended into
what will be known in cognition. This occurs according to the same
sequence of meaning-extension discussed above. Such facilitation can
occur both at what is called the point of "encoding" and at the point of
"retrieval." In LLT terms, the former is equivalent to "affirmation at the
protopoint" (Rychlak, 1994), wherein the material to be cognized is
actively organized along one or more meaningful dimensions, including
the dimension of affective assessment.
If affective assessment is truly a very basic dimension which can be

brought to bear at what we have referred to as the point of "encoding,"
then it should be possible to demonstrate these heuristic properties.
Ulasevich (1993) carried out a "Judging John" experiment, in which he
showed that subjects in a learning task will likely grasp the affective
quality of a word that they do not yet "know" before they can give a word
with a similar meaning to it. He did this by having subjects look at a
computer screen and attempt to memorize a list of statements
concerning "John." Subjects first read through the list on a practice
trial, and then were immediately given a recall trial in which sentence
stems were presented.

If, after a predetermined period of time, the

subjects had not been able to give an answer, one of two sets of
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instructions appeared on the screen asking subjects either to type a word
similar to the one they could not think of, or to type P or N for whether
the affective quality of the word was positive or negative. Again, subjects
were better able to provide the correct affective quality than a word with
similar meaning. In fact, even in the latter case, the incorrect words
presented tended to themselves have the correct affective quality.
In order to examine the heuristic value of affective assessment at the
point of "retrieval," Hughes (1993) had subjects think of appropriate
examples of persons whom they considered to be either "positive" or
"negative" in appeal. After bringing to mind such an individual, subjects
were asked to read through a list of personality adjectives and mark
those that most aptly described the individual in question. Following
two recall opportunities, during which subjects were first asked to record
in writing all of the adjectives which served as secondacy predications to
the affirmed (primacy) target, followed by any other adjectives that could
be recalled, she asked subjects to "reverse" the target of their primacy
predications. At this point, subjects had presumably exhausted their
memory from within the broader context provided by the primacy affirmed
predication.

The new task involved having subjects think of

(conceptualize) an individual about whom they felt the opposite of the
previous individual (for example, moving from a "liked" to a "disliked"
individual, or vice versa). Once this "re-predication" had taken place,
subjects were asked to once again think of the initial list of adjectives,
and to try to recall any additional words which came to mind.
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Specifically, subjects were asked to try to recall any of the previous
adjectives which might suitably apply to the new target. It was indeed
found that subjects recalled a significant number of additional words,
but these words were consistent with the new primary affective
predication. This is similar to the experiment reported earlier, in which
it was found that cueing subjects with a broader predicate meaning in

the case of word triplets showed a greater facilitation effect on memory
than cues whose range of meaning was not capable of subsuming the
other members of the word triplet. Such a finding is also reminiscent of
the work of Sperling ( 1960} cited above, which demonstrated the
importance of the protopoint affirmation made by the individual, above
and beyond purely sensory factors. Subjects had clearly "seen" all the
words presented in the present experiment, yet what they recalled was
sequaciously determined (at least in part} by the precedent framework
they brought to bear in the task.

CHAPTER 4
LOCKEAN THEORETICAL PERSPECTNES ON
MOOD AND MEMORY

Semantic Network and Schema Theories
Bower ( 1981) has worked extensively with this area, and he interprets
the findings of this vast literature in terms of an associative network
theory of memory. Within this framework, information is represented in
mind in the form of interrelated networks of nodes, these being
connected by associative linkages of varying strength. He states:
Human memory can be modeled in terms of an associative network
of semantic concepts and schemata that are used to describe
events. An event is represented in memory by a cluster of
descriptive propositions. These are recorded in memory by
establishing new associative connections among instances of the
concepts used in describing the event. The basic unit of thought is
the proposition: the basic process of thought is activation of a
proposition and its concepts. (Bower, 1981, p. 134)
These nodes themselves represent a vast array of concepts, and also
include--in addition to memories--such things as emotions and the
contexts of various experiences. When a particular node is activated,
either by internal or external stimulation, associated nodes are also
activated. If the activation of some particular node or network of nodes
reaches a critical threshold, then a memory or feeling may enter
conscious awareness. According to Bower, subthreshold excitations can
48
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also add together, so that a number of weak stimuli or cues may also
cross the threshold to consciousness. Bower here draws upon a concrete
physical analogy to elaborate his point:
A relevant analogy is an electrical network in which terminals
correspond to concepts or event nodes (units), connecting wires
correspond to associative relations with more or less resistance,
and electrical energy corresponds to activation that is injected into
one or more nodes (units) in the network. Activation of a node can
be accomplished either by presentation of the corresponding
stimulus pattern or by prior activation of an associated thought.
(Bower, 1981, p. 134)
This model can account for the finding that mood state-dependent
retrieval is most efficient when the individual is undergoing a recall
rather than a recognition task. In the former case, multiple-cues are
needed to raise activation above the critical threshold, whereas in the
latter case, presentation of the stimuli directly may retrieve the stored
information without need of additional cueing.
The primary predictions made by the Bower (1981) theory include (1) a
mood-dependent retrieval effect, and (2) a mood congruity effect. The
former is accounted for by the supposition that mood at encoding
becomes associated with the material to be learned, such that
reinstatement of that mood acts as an automatic retrieval cue to
facilitate recall. That is, activation of the mood node associated with the
memory of interest increases likelihood that the relevant memory will
also be activated through its close association.

The latter effect is

presumed to occur when the valence of the affectively-toned material in
the environment is congruent with the learner's state. In a situation
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such as this, the learner is thought to selectively enhance positive
material when in a positive mood, and negative material when in a
negative mood.

That is, the active emotion node sends activation to

those perceptual categories which are associatively linked to it, thus
rendering these categories ready for use. In addition, events that lead to
pleasant evaluations will enhance a positive mood, while events which
elicit a negative evaluation will tend to enhance a negative mood. In
both cases, this congruity is hypothesized to lead to greater processing
and hence better memory.
The schema theories of mood and memory, which were said to be
similar to associative network theories of the sort proposed by Bower
( 1981 ), generally adopt the position that people have cognitive schemas
which are consistent with their ongoing mood state. Schema theories
which examine depression sometimes employ the notion of a negative
schema (e.g., Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) through
which the individual frames the world and the people in it.

Once

activated, this negative schema focuses the individual's attention of
negative aspects of the environment, which in turn supports and hence
perpetuates the generally negative outlook. A schema can be seen as an
outline of a commonly occurring event or a prototypical exemplar of a
concept. But schemas are not only employed by depressed persons, and
another example might be a "restaurant script," consisting of the
knowledge of the events that occur when eating at a fancy restaurant
(Minsky, 1975). When such a schema is activated during the course of
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information processing, attention is automatically directed towards
information relevant to the schema.

According to schema theory,

ambiguous aspects of the environment will be interpreted according to
any biases induced by the schema, and information consistent with the
schema will be more readily elaborated upon and so better connected to
other facts in memocy (for a contradictocy set of findings, see Pezdek,
Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989). Differences between
network theories such as Bower's and schema theories are perhaps not
great, and, indeed, Bower himself frequently speaks of the activation of
cognitive schemas within the framework of his own theory. However,
schema theories do not employ the notion of spreading activation
(Ingram, 1984) and are somewhat more compatible with Logical Learning
Theocy than Bower's ( 1981) explication of network theory. Though this
is probably not the intent of the majority of authors subscribing to
schema theories, a schema may be regarded as similar to a pair of
precedent conceptual spectacles which sequaciously "color" what is to
follow in experience. So, for example, the depressed individual will tend
to (sequaciously) extend negative meanings in experience more readily
than positive meanings.

Isen's Co2nitive Psych0Io2ical Perspective
Another of the more prolific contributors to the area of mood and
memory research has been Alice Isen. Seeking to take into consideration
the difficulties associated with expectancy and demand when doing
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research of this sort, Isen has produced a large number of studies outside
the laboratory (though by no means exclusively in this realm) in an
attempt to obtain greater ecological validity. Typically, this has been
done using subtle mood manipulations and indirect measures of mood.
It is worth noting, however, that Isen has failed to utilize idiographically

evaluated materials, relying instead upon nomothetic evaluations where
applicable. For this reason her research suffers from some of the same
ambiguities as the more "conventional" research she has sought to
improve upon.
Isen's theoretical outlook is firmly grounded in a cognitive
psychological framework. It is her belief that mood-related phenomena
result from the activation of mood-induced cognitive processes, with
important differential effects to be obtained depending upon how aware
an individual is of their existence and/ or "activation."

In line with

Posner and Snyder (1975), who introduced the distinction, Clark and
Isen ( 1982) have suggested that the cognitive processes that occur during
moods are either "automatic" or "controlled."

Automatic cognitive

processes are thought to occur without intention or awareness, so that
they do not "interfere" with other ongoing cognitive processes.
Controlled processes, on the other hand, being both effortful and
conscious, occupy our limited capacity information processing system
and therefore can disrupt other cognitive activities.

Clark and Isen

(1982) attribute the majority of mood effects to automatic processes,
which are the subject of the preponderance of her work. In this view, the
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hedonic tone associated with the mood-inducing event insidiously causes
us to retrieve similarly toned thoughts, thoughts which then influence
our judgments, decisions, and behaviors.

Note that rather than a

precedent-sequacious meaning-extension taking place here, we see the
material/efficient cause activation analogy being drawn upon. Another
difficulty is that Clark and Isen do not specify the mechanism whereby
the cognitive processes associated with a mood switch from the
automatic to the controlled variety. Further, this latter notion of an
independent ("controlled") contribution of the subject to the task at
hand seems a bit out of place in the sort of theoretical framework
adopted by Isen, though she apparently does not see any discrepancy
here.
How does mood influence the individual in automatic fashion? From
a nodal network theory's perspective, the most likely factor would seem
to be the absence or lack of a label or appraisal of an affective state. In
the case of Isen's account, the typical cause of mood is an event of
modest hedonic relevance, sufficient to prime thoughts sharing the same
hedonic tone but insufficient to interrupt ongoing behavior and attract
focal attention, occurrences Isen associates with emotion. Labeling does
not occur because the event initially engages only automatic associative
or retrieval processes: conducting an appraisal or "meaning" analysis
would require the involvement of higher level cognitive processes which
are ordinarily reserved for events of more importance.
On some occasions, mood may affect us in a different way, via so-
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called controlled cognitive processes. These are times when the presence
of the mood becomes a factor in conscious decision-making or problem
solving. The specific instances discussed by Clark and lsen (1982) are
self-regulatory in nature; that is, people in good moods make decisions
designed to protect their mood from an impending negative event or
people in bad moods think or behave in ways designed to "repair" their
moods. However, it seems that one could just as easily offer a simple
threshold explanation for these phenomenon.

Resource Allocation Models
According to the resource allocation or capacity model explicated by
Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), there is a limited amount of attentional
capacity within the individual, and this is divided when two or more
tasks are engaged in simultaneously.

Consequently, information or

material which does not require great processing demands (and hence is
easily processed) can be expected to result in less consistent mood
effects.

So, for example, material which has been essentially over-

learned (e.g., childhood memories) will not be greatly affected by mood's
influence.

The same also holds true for highly meaningful or highly

organized materials. In those situations, however, in which processing
demands are relatively great, the theory predicts that we should observe a
more pronounced impact of mood on memory. This prediction is similar
to that made by Bower's theory in relation to such over-learned items.
The mechanisms, as described, are slightly different, though perhaps not
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incompatible.

The Ellis and Ashbrook model makes three primary

assumptions to account for the effects of emotional states on memory:
( 1) emotional states produce their effects on cognitive activities by
regulating the amount of capacity available to be allocated to a given
task; (2) the encoding of information usually requires some allocation of
cognitive capacity or effort; and (3) memory performance is frequently
correlated with the amount of capacity allocated to the cognitive task
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1989).
The resource allocation approach to mood and memory issues differs
from semantic network and schema theories primarily in its focus upon
the allocation of attentional capacity. Network and schema theories are
generally more concerned with how current memory organization affects
the processing of information in memory. What all these theories share
in common, however, and a crucial way in which they differ from Logical
Learning Theory, is their focus upon energic conceptions as a
foundational notion.

Both the spreading of "activation" and the

appropriation of "attention" eschew the primacy of the Logos in favor of
what appear to be Bios conceptions.
Because the resource allocation model will not be discussed further
here, we give two brief examples of research from this perspective.
Results consistent with this hypothesis were found by Hasher, Rose,
Zacks, Sanft, and Doren (1985), who found no evidence for mood
congruence effects (an otherwise reliable phenomenon) when they
presented subjects with narrative passages during learning and then
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tested for recall of these passages.

According to this theory, highly

organized narrative passages should have been relatively impervious to
mood effects. A study carried out by Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez ( 1984)
also clearly supported the notion of resource allocation. They employed
a sentence-completion task with varying levels of difficulty, such that
some of the sentences required a great deal of effort to complete, while
others were comparatively easy. They found that depressed subjects had
more difficulty recalling the portions of the difficult task, but not so for
the easy task. This is as would be predicted by the Ellis and Ashbrook
( 1988) model, which hypothesizes that depressed states will have their
greatest impact on tasks which place a heavy emphasis on encoding.

CHAPTERS
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
In most of the recent discussions of mood and memory research, the
predominant view has been that the effects of emotion-inducing events
are dependent on changes in emotion per se. However, there is now
considerable evidence that emotion as a subjective feeling state may
often be unrelated to differences in recall. While an emotional state may
be particularly salient after exposure to a mood-induction, it does not
necessarily follow that the emotion per se has caused the patterning of
subsequent recall. While some alternative explanations argue that the
immediate effects of the induction may also include the priming of
cognitive schemas and conceptual categories (e.g., Bower [ 19811 or Isen
[ 1982]), this is not the perspective adopted by Logical Learning Theory.
In what follows, it will be argued that the LLT conception of affective
assessment can adequately account for the familiar, replicable findings
in the mood and memory area, as well as for many findings not explained
by theories which make some form of emotional "arousal" the mediating
variable.

The Effects of Mood on Perception and Judgment
There is a fair amount of literature consisting of studies in which
moods are either induced or existing affect is measured and the effect on
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some perception or judgment is assessed. According to Morris (1987), the
evidence from these studies tends to confirm popular wisdom that mood
does influence how things look to us.

He notes that although that

influence is most often mood congruent, there is some variability with
regard to positive and negative affective states--precisely in accord with
the many and varied findings on affective assessment mentioned above.
For example, past research has found that while individuals in positive
moods show increased helping and attraction toward others, the effects
of negative mood are more inconsistent. According to Logical Learning
Theory such findings are a result of the precedent-sequacious lines of
meaning extension taking place in each particular case. That is, the
affective assessment which is rendered sequaciously "colors" the
experiences to follow, determining the subjective meaning or quality
which they will have for the individual. This evaluation is rendered over
and above what is actually taking place in experience, for this is the
nature of affective assessment--which is a transcending telosponse. This
is a logical--and not a biological--determinism. It is worth noting that
the findings of many of the studies to be reported here are similar to
those mentioned in the section on LLT, despite the general lack of a
mood manipulation in the latter works. This is taken as further support
for the notion that both mood and emotion are not "states" of
activation, but rather logical extensions of meaning in precedentsequacious fashion.
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Mood and subjective evaluations. In one of the more well-known
studies to be done in this area, Alice Isen and her colleagues (Isen,
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978, Study 1) induced positive mood in a
shopping mall by giving a small promotional gift to individuals who
passed by. These persons were stopped a short time later and asked to
participate in what was, ostensibly, a consumer satisfaction survey of
their televisions and automobiles.

In contrast to a control group

comprised of individuals from the mall who had not received gifts, the
experimental group reported more favorable perceptions of both their
televisions and automobiles. Isen (1975) has suggested, in accord with
such theories of spreading activation as that proposed by Anderson and
Bower ( 1973 ), that the effects of positive and negative moods on behavior
result from the relative availability of mood congruent thoughts. This is
thought to occur through a sort of "priming" of congruent memories,
which are theorized as being located near one another within the
"semantic network." That is, when a given event is activated by some
external occurrence, other nearby nodes are similarly "activated," thereby
increasing the likelihood that a given memory will cross the limen of
consciousness.

This notion is suggestive of a drive conception, and

hence is incompatible with Logical Learning Theory.
In a second experiment, Isen et al. (1978) induced positive or negative
mood by having subjects win or lose while playing a video game. While
subjects in the positive mood condition (those who won while playing the
video game) recalled more positive traits from a list of personality trait
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words presented previously, those who lost the video game were no more
likely to recall negative than positive words. Again, we find individuals
in positive moods recalling a greater number of mood congruent items
than those in negative moods. While the presence of positive mood may,
in both cases, have contributed to a greater availability of mood
congruent thoughts, Logical Learning Theory would contend that it is
not the increased availability of thoughts per se which determines mood,
but rather the broader context of meaning (positive or negative)
predicated of the situation in general, and then extended into lived
experience.
In order to provide further support to Isen's notion that mood
differentially affects the availability of mood-congruent items, Clark and
Waddell ( 1983) tested the hypothesis that mood states would
differentially impact on the accessibility of mood congruent thoughts in
response to situations involving helping, attraction toward another
person, and the acquisition of information. After having experienced
either a positive, negative, or no mood induction, subjects were asked to
imagine themselves in situations in which (a) helping was possible, (b)
they were to meet a blind date, and (c) they had the opportunity to
acquire free brochures.
situation.

Free associations were then given to each

Those subjects who were induced to feel good had

significantly more positive first affective associations to situations in
which helping was possible and to the occasion of meeting a blind date
than did subjects in either the control or negative mood conditions.
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Subjects induced to feel bad had more negative first affective
associations to all three situations than did other subjects, though these
differences were not significant.

In a similar vein, children with a

positive or "happy" outlook have been found to be more helpful to others
than children who have a negative or "unhappy" outlook (Strayer, 1980).
In order to assess the possibility that mood might also affect our
perceptions of others, Izard et al. (1965) manipulated mood and then
examined how this influenced resolutions of binocularly rivalrous
stimuli. Relevant affect (positive or negative) was created by having the
experimenter be either pleasant or unpleasant.

The pleasant

experimenter would, for example, praise the subject's performance in an
attempt to create a warm and supportive relationship, whereas the
unpleasant experimenter was critical of the subject's performance,
calling into question the individual's abilities. Izard et al. 's dependent
measure consisted of the way in which subjects subsequently resolved
the stereoscopic rivalries which were created by displaying pairs of
photographs in a stereoscope.

These photographic pairs contained

either a happy or an angcy expression of the same individual, or two
pictures of an interpersonal scene involving two people, one scene
showing a hostile and the other a friendly interaction. When subjects
were asked to report what they saw, there were significant differences for
both kinds of stimuli: that is, the subjects exposed to an unpleasant
experimenter were apt to see more hostile faces and interactions than
subjects who had been exposed to a pleasant experimenter.
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Mood and expectancy. Johnson and Tversky (1983) examined the
role of mood on expectations of positive and negative future events.
After manipulating mood by having subjects read newspaper stories
which reported death by either leukemia, homicide, or fire (a control
condition which did not involve death was also included), subjects were
asked to fill out a questionnaire on which they indicated their level of
concern for each of 18 causes of death. As predicted, they found that the
stories about the deaths had the effect of creating a more negative mood
among the experimental subjects than among those in the control
condition. In addition, they reported an increased concern over death by
the 18 means as a whole (an increased "global" concern). Surprisingly,
they found no increase in the level of concern for the "target" cause, that
is, the cause about which they had just read.

This finding poses

problems for associative and semantic network theories. According to
such accounts, exposure to a negative event of some sort (i.e., a death)
should lead to the spreading of activation to those nodes closely related
to this event, leading to the propensity for a greater negative reaction to
this particular type of event: in other words, events that are closely
related to the story should be influenced to a greater extent that those
which are unrelated. According to LLT, however, the affective assessment
rendered (positive or negative) is broader in scope than the event of
interest per se.

Hence, it is not surprising to find this meaning-

extension being predicated of several of the available alternatives.
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According to Schwarz and Clore (1983), evaluative decisions which
are rendered may be "mistakenly" based upon the affective state or mood
which one is in while making such judgments.

To test this, they

performed two experiments looking at the role of mood-related factors
upon judgments of happiness and satisfaction with one's life.

They

postulated that mood would have a differential impact on the subjects'
ratings of well-being depending upon whether or not they were made
conscious of the possible influence mood might have.

In the first

experiment, moods were induced by asking subjects to provide vivid
descriptions of happy or sad events which had recently occurred in their
lives. In order to isolate the effect of mood, the experiment was run in
"an unusual soundproof room" (Schwarz and Clore, 1983, p. 515), with
some subjects being told that the room had the general effect of making
subjects feel good, while others were told the reverse (i.e., that the room
would make them feel bad). The experimenters reasoned that in making
subjects aware of the possible causes of their moods, they would become
less likely to be influenced by these states; in contrast, when subjects
were not made aware of their moods, the usual mood-congruent
judgments were expected. As expected, subjects who were not cued as to
the possible influence of their mood made life-satisfaction judgments in
a mood-congruent direction, while those who were made aware did not
display a similar effect.
Here again, we have evidence of precedent-sequacious cognitive
processing taking place. In this case, the researchers have capitalized on
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the fact that if subjects are given a plausible precedent (i.e., that their
moods may "mistakenly" affect their judgments), they will sequaciously
extend this meaning into ongoing behavior (Rychlak, 1994, p. 97). This
is reminiscent of the research mentioned above involving the notions of
"einstellung" and "aufgabe." The aufgabe (the experimenter's predication
via task instruction) has once again established an einstellung
(predicating bias) for the subject under study, a bias which is then
extended into the results of the experiment.

This study is

"contaminated," therefore, by the fact that the observed results may have
less to do with mood per se, than with the willingness of research
subjects to comply with the perceived demands (demand characteristics)
of the experiment.

Mood Induction Research
The research into the relationship between mood/ emotion and
memory has expanded greatly in recent years, to the point that there are
now journals dealing specifically with such topics.

Within this area,

however, much of the thinking remains what we have called
"mediational," or essentially non-teleological.

Intimations of drive

theory can be found in, for example, the network theory of Bower ( 1981,
see above), in which discrete brain units are "activated" to some
threshold level, causing the effects on memory observed in the
experimental context.
In the majority of the research on mood and memory, it has been
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found that mood does have some influence on what is learned and/or
recalled in subsequent memory tasks. According to Logical Learning
Theory (LLT), this is as it should be, for as we have said, it is when
someone has affirmed a precedent meaning (e.g., like or dislike) that we
see this meaning being sequaciously extended into lived experience. And
so we find that positive moods facilitate the recall of positive material,
with the reverse generally occurring with material of a negative sort (as
rated idiographically by the individual, of course). All findings of this
sort are consistent with the precedent-sequacious style of explanation
that LLT advocates.

A "mood" is clearly a context meaning that is

predicated by the person involved. It is worth noting that idiographic
differences were not simply overlooked by the Lockean theorists. Though
they realized that people had unique idiographic associations to
learnable items, the way in which these unique organizations functioned
was taken to be identical to the way in which the nomothetic measures
functioned: all learning and memory was seen to involve associative
strengths based upon the frequency and contiguity of verbal inputs,
organized externally and carried along in the mediated process. It did
not make sense, from this perspective, to single out such idiographic
factors.
In this section we examine more of what has been discovered
empirically about the relationship between mood and memory.

The

predicted effects of mood on memory vary to some degree depending upon
the theory being put to test. For example, the resource allocation model
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of Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) predicts that the experience of a negative
mood will interfere with the performance of any task, including memory
tasks, particularly as the demands for "processing" become greater. Yet
another possibility is that mood will selectively bias or distort memory in
some way. Thus, the mood and memory perspective adopted by Bower
(1981) assumes that the way an experience is encoded for storage in
long-term memory is largely determined by the encoder's mood state at
the time of encoding. According to this view, the mood consists of a
number of elements, all of which go together to form a context which can
subsequently be "reactivated."

Logical Learning Theory,

in

contradistinction to these theories, holds that it is context qua
predication which is most important for the recall of relevant
information. Thus, LLT argues that affective assessments will play the
greatest role in determining recall in those instances in which this can
be observed.

Those studies involving mood manipulations have typically applied
variations on a number of common techniques, including (a) the Velten
( 1968) technique, (b) hypnosis, (c) success/failure experiences, (d)
musical mood induction procedures, (e) posturing, and (fl a "memory
elicitation" technique (Blaney, 1986, p. 235).

One advantage of such

mood induction techniques is that they aid in overcoming problems of
selection bias; that is, they allow for random assignment of subjects to
conditions.

The Velten procedure remains one of the more validated methods for the
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induction of mood states, with numerous researchers finding psychomotor
speed or activation being positively correlated with moods induced via this
procedure. A potential drawback of this and other mood inductions is seen in
evidence which suggests that the duration of the effects of mood inductions
are usually brief. Specifically, there is evidence that the affective
consequences of mood manipulations are normatively quite brief (Frost
& Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Ranieri & Ziess, 1984). This

may be seen as calling into question the utility of post-test measures of
the effectiveness of a given mood induction. Memory elicitation, a related
technique which involves the recollection of relevant memories by subjects,
also enjoys some popularity among researchers. Though originally developed
for work with children, this procedure has also been used successfully with
adults (Morris, 1989). Morris has said with regard to such procedures: "Recall,
though a different 'medium' than perception, presents the same
possibilities ... Not only is there little doubt that affect can be generated through
recall as well as other thought processes such as imagining but, in addition,
there is good reason to suppose that the most likely result would be a mood-like
state" (p. 26).
In the following sections, we examine what has been found in the two
most prominent areas of the mood and memory literature: mood state
dependent memory and mood congruent memory.

Mood state dependent memory. According to the mood state
dependent retrieval hypothesis, what an individual is able to retrieve
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from memory when in a given mood is dependent to some degree upon
what the individual learned when previously in that mood. That is, in
network theoretical terms, the more similar the network "activation"
(qua drive} entailed by the prevailing context is to the encoding context
of the material to be recalled, the more likely will the person be to recall
what was learned when previously in the same mood state.

Bower,

Monteiro, and Gilligan ( 1978} have spoken of this as "endogenous statedependent retention" (p. 573}.

In cases such as these, the affective

valence (positive, negative, or neutral} of the material learned is not
expected to be of importance.

While mood congruence effects are

possible both during encoding and retrieval, state dependent memory
effects require mood manipulation on two separate occasions, and hence
are more concerned with retrieval effects.

The evidence for this

phenomenon, however, is somewhat equivocal and open to alternative
interpretation.
Some support for the mood state dependent retrieval hypothesis was
obtained in a non-laboratory setting by Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy
( 1977}, who studied manic-depressive inpatients. Subjects were asked to
generate word associations on one occasion, and then to try and recall
them four days later. As would be predicted by the mood state dependent
hypothesis, recall for the material was related to the degree of mood
change exhibited by the subjects, with those subjects undergoing greater
levels of mood change recalling less of the relevant material. In this
experiment, however, we run into a conceptual problem which is to be
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found in much of the research in the area of mood and memory (Blaney,
1986): it is possible that these effects are better explained in terms of a
mood congruity hypothesis.

That is, from the perspective such as

Bower's (1981) semantic network theory, though greater recall was
associated with increased similarity of moods across the four day period,
it is possible that the material recalled was "activated" by the nature of
the material itself, and not the similarity of mood states across
occasions.

In LLT terms, the affective assessment of the material

rendered by the individual was congruent with the material recalled,
leading to a sequacious facilitation of recall in the Logos.
Another ostensible example of mood state dependent memory in a
non-laboratory setting was reported by Bower (1981), and involved the
case of Sirhan Sirhan, the man who, in 1968, assassinated Bobby
Kennedy. After he was apprehended, Sirhan initially claimed that he did
not remember committing the murder. When placed under hypnosis,
however, and made to relive the events of that day, Sirhan became
greatly agitated--and only then was able to recall the events.

Bower

(1981) notes:
Under hypnosis, as Sirhan became more worked up and excited, he
recalled progressively more, the memories tumbling out while his
excitement built to a crescendo leading up to the shooting. At
that point Sirhan would scream out the death curses, "fire" the
shots, and then choke as he reexperienced the Secret Service
bodyguard nearly throttling him after he was caught. (p. 129)
As suggested above with regard to the creating of an emotional reaction,
it is through the extension of relevant meanings that this process is
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facilitated. In the case of Sirhan, this conceptual reframing of a relevant
circumstance was aided by the use of hypnosis. In other words, Sirhan
was facilitated in bringing to bear currently "unused" or "unrecognized"
premises from out of an "unseen" region of mind.
Yet, as suggested above, evidence of mood state dependent retrieval
has not always been easy to find. In some of his initial work in this
area, Bower (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978) was unable to find
support for this effect. College-age subjects were placed in either happy
or sad moods and then were asked to memorize a single list of 16 or 20
words. When recall was tested either 10 minutes or 24 hours later, there
was no main effect of induced mood, although subjects in the longer
retention interval recalled fewer words. This latter finding is as would be
expected, since as "time" moves along many and varied predications
continue to be made, sometimes altering the initial rendering of an
object or event.

The failure to find mood state dependent retrieval,

however, detracts from the notion of an "activated" context. A similar
failure to find state dependent effects when using a single list
noninterference paradigm was reported by Nasby and Yando (1982). This
study, however, unlike that of Bower et al. ( 1978) employed children as
subjects. Bower and his associates explained this effect as resulting
from the distinctiveness of the single list, such that subjects could
retrieve the same number of words whether placed in the same or an
altered mood.

That is, increased activation of retrieval cues did not

affect subsequent recall.
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Despite this failure to find state dependence using the single-list
paradigm. Bower and his colleagues ( 1978) were able to find supportive
evidence in a different portion of their study. This part of their study
employed a within-session recall task with elated or depressed mood
inductions. They had their experimental subjects learn two lists--one
while happy and the other while sad--and then recall in either an elated
or depressed mood. Control subjects learned both word lists in either an
elated or depressed mood state, then also recalled in a similar state.
Compared to the control subjects, those subjects in the experimental
condition showed a facilitation of memory for words learned in the same
mood, but interference on those words learned in the opposite mood.
Again we have here the possibility of a mood congruent learning effect, so
that it is unclear just what these results suggest.
More consistent evidence for mood-state-dependent retrieval can be
found in those studies which require subjects to recall happy or sad
experiences while in either happy or sad moods. In such experiments,
retrieval is believed to be state dependent because the material recalled is
presumed to have been learned in the same mood as that induced in the
experimental context. Once again, however, the LLT advocate is free to
argue that it is the sequacious extension of congruent meaning that
"accounts for" such effects.

Madigan and Bollenbach ( 1982). for

example, used the Velten (1968) procedure to induce elated, depressed,
and neutral moods in their subjects, then tested in separate experiments
the positivity of personal memories and the positivity of free
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associations. They found in their first two expertnients that subjects in
the elation condition recalled more memories of a pleasant nature than
subjects in the depressed condition. In the third experiment of their
study, subjects in the elated condition recalled a greater number of
pleasant memories than subjects in the depressive condition.
Forgas, Bower, and Krantz (1984) used hypnotic induction to induce
elated and depressed moods in subjects, then examined the amount
recalled with regard to the stressfulness or comfortableness of previous
experiences. They found that their depressively induced subjects recalled
more about their stressful experiences, while the elation induced
subjects recalled more of their comfortable experiences. Though these
studies have been discussed in terms of state dependence, it is again
possible that they arise from mood congruence effects.

That is, the

affective valence of the material recalled is generally congruent with the
ongoing mood state, so that the effects of each cannot be adequately
separated. However, such findings are in the direction which would be
predicted by LLT.

Mood congruence. Mood congruence refers to the finding that
people will generally encode more information which is congruent than
incongruent with their ongoing mood.

Here we find one of the main

differences between studies of mood congruent and state dependent
memory, at least with regard to methodology.

In contrast to studies

which are designed to examine mood state dependent retrieval, studies of
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mood congruity do not require subjects to experience a given mood on
two separate occasions. And, whereas the research findings for mood
state dependent retrieval remain open to question, the findings on mood
congruence have been more robust (Blaney, 1986). In terms of Bower's
(1981) network theory, affective state acts to render more salient those
emotional characteristics in the environment which are consistent with
an individual's emotional state.

However, such findings are also

consistent with the Logical Learning Theory contention that mood states
are not akin to "drive" states which can be "activated" on the analogy of
an electrical circuit. Once again, it is of the nature of "logical" meaningextension to find such effects--not a biological activation of some sort.
It is assumed by network theories such as Bower's (1981) that mood

states can act as cues for selective recall of mood-congruent information
(mood-congruent retrieval). Thus, it may for example be expected that
pleasant memories will be more easily retrieved than negative or neutral
memories when the person is in a positive mood at the time of recall. A
similar but conceptually distinct aspect of mood congruent memory
involves the selective encoding of new information (mood-congruent
encoding). In this case, mood states supposedly influence the salience
and selective encoding of new mood-congruent information, resulting in
better retention and recall of that information.

Although the mood-

based conceptualization appears theoretically sound, key predictions
have not been upheld. Most of the confirmatory findings involve the
selective advantages of encoding or retrieving mood-congruent
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information.
Johnson, Petzel, Hartney, and Morgan (1983), for example,
performed a study examining the memory of depressed and nondepressed
undergraduate subjects. Specifically, they looked at memory for tasks
which subjects had been asked to perform, and which they had been
either successful or unsuccessful in completing. Subjects were led to
believe that whether or not they completed these tasks was under their
control. In fact, however, the experimenters had set up the experiment
so that all subjects performed equally with regard to success or failure.
They found, as they had predicted, that depressed subjects subsequently
recalled more of their uncompleted tasks, while nondepressed subjects
recalled more of their completed tasks. Similar to these results are the
findings of Roth and Rehm (1980) who found that depressed inpatients
were more interested in examining instances of their failures than
psychiatric controls. In both instances the task at hand was predicated
negatively, with negative or disliked meaning being extended
sequaciously to the contents under "processing."
A frequently cited work of particular interest for the present work is a
study done by Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro ( 1981 ). These researchers
hypnotized subjects to feel either happy or sad before having them read a
story about two fictional characters. The characters, Jack and Andre,
each experienced a number of either unhappy or happy events. After a
delay of 24 hours, subjects returned and were asked to recall, now in a
neutral mood, as much of the story as possible. They found that those

75

subjects who had been placed in sad moods recalled a greater number of
facts about sad Jack than happy Andre, while those in the elation
condition recalled more facts about happy Andre then sad Jack. There
was no significant relationship between mood and the total number of
facts (both positive and negative) recalled. This study is important in
having examined the effect of mood at encoding (mood-congruence),
without confounding the issue of state-dependent learning effects by
manipulating mood also at recall.
Evidence for mood-congruence has been discovered in paradigms in
which subjects are asked to recall a list of positive or negative adjectives
or events which they previously read or heard while in an induced mood.
Typical induction procedures involve having subjects read lists of either
positive or negative statements (Velten, 1968), or undergo hypnotic
procedures (Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) in an attempt to induce
the desired positive or negative moods. The rationale for such procedures
is that by controlling the mood the subject experiences, any differential
effects arising within the experimental context will be the result of mood
and not other extraneous variables.

What is typically found is that

subjects in positive moods are more likely to recall (or recognize) positive
adjectives, while those persons in negative moods are more likely to
recall (or recognize) negative adjectives (Alexander & Guenther, 1986;
Natale & Hantas, 1982; Nasby & Yando, 1982).
Another interesting test of the mood-congruity hypothesis was done
by Clark and Teasdale (1985), and yielded differential results for males
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and females. That is. while there was no evidence for mood-congruity
effects among the males participating in the experiment, the females. did
show the effect in relation to affectively-toned personality trait words
and abstract nouns.

They discovered in a later portion of their

experiment that the females were significantly more likely to have
employed the materials of interest at some time in the past. Similar
were the results of an experiment carried out by Einstein and Ellis
( 1987), in which they examined the recall of depressed males and females
for either fairy tales or technically-oriented material. They found that
the depressed females recalled the technically-oriented passages more
poorly than neutral mood controls, but the same did not hold true for
the fairy-tales.

The depressed males, in contrast,

showed a reverse

pattern: that is, their recall of the technically-oriented materials was not
significantly affected, though they showed poorer recall of the fairy-tales.
Einstein and Ellis concluded that differential levels of past experience
and "interest values" for the content of the passages was likely
responsible for the observed effects. This notion of "interest value" is
clearly an example of what LLT would call affective assessment, while the
results themselves are akin to results reported by Rychlak, Tasto,
Andrews, and Ellis (1973) in a study on the RV-positive effect. They
showed in a study of college subjects who showed elevations on a
measure of masculinity, that such subjects learned masculine words (but
not their feminine words) according to an RV-positive effect in a freerecall task.

The reverse was found for female subjects, who showed an
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RV-positive effect for the learning of feminine words.

Finally, we

conclude this section with a study designed specifically to investigate the
relationship between mood-state dependent and mood-congruent
memory, contrasting the outcomes predicted by each approach with what
actually occurred.
In a work designed to replicate the Bower et al. ( 1978) experiment
discussed above, Lewis and Williams (1989) employed essentially the
same design, but with some important additions.

These authors

approached the experiment. not from a nodal network theory perspective,
but rather directly from the point of view of LLT. The primary goal of this
experiment was to compare in one study both the mood state dependent
memory effect and the mood-congruity effect.

The former is

fundamentally inconsistent with LLT, for as the authors point out, "The
concept

of state-dependent learning ... has

always

implied

a

fundamentally physiological explanation; the ability to retrieve memories
is presumed to depend on the condition or 'state' of the central nervous
system" (Lewis and Williams, 1989, p. 157).
In seeking to further clarify the relationship between mood statedependent retrieval and mood-congruence effects, Lewis and Williams
had subjects rate (affectively assess; see above) words from the Anderson
( 1968) norms on a scale of likability with values ranging from "like
much" and "like slightly," to "dislike slightly" and "dislike much." This
provided an idiographic measure of individual subject word-preference,
thus allowing them to look for potential mood-congruence effects within
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the state-dependent retrieval effect. Lewis and Williams hypothesized
that subjects would indeed show a mood-state-dependent retrieval effect,
but that this effect would be due to a mood congruity effect not apparent
in the earlier Bower et al. (1978) study.
As hypothesized, Lewis and Williams found that when a list was
facilitated in recall as indicated by a congruence between mood at
learning and mood at recall, the recall advantage was manifest only as
mood-congruent recall. In other words, when a word list is favored in
recall by a negative mood, the facilitation of recall only occurs for words
which the subjects have rated as disliked; similarly, when a word list
which has been learned is favored in recall by a positive mood, the
increased recall involves words the subjects have rated as liked. This
study, while not altogether incompatible with the mood state dependent
retrieval effect hypothesized by Bower (1981), does render such an
account incomplete by calling into question the true nature of nodal
"activation." From the perspective of such a theory, there should not
have been differences in the numbers of liked and disliked words recalled
in the varying experimental conditions, since each subject had the
opportunity to learn and recall an equal number of liked and disliked
words. More importantly, it provides increased evidence for the value of
the mood congruity hypothesis, and the precedent-sequacious nature of
meaning-extension posited by LLT. As Lewis and Williams ( 1989) state:
The favorable effect of matching moods during learning and recall
appears to depend on the subject's ability to extend meaning to
experience in fundamentally different ways, rather than on the
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experimenter's ability to induce fundamentally different "states."
Put another way, the mood-dependent retrieval effect reflects more
of what we commonly refer to as a "state of mind" than it reflects
what some people call a "brain state." The "context" upon which
memory is dependent is logical and meaningful rather than
structural or associationistic." (p. 168)
Mood asymmetry and mood incon"ruity.

Thus far we have

examined the research in light of an associative network theory of
memory, which predicts that mood will prime those memories with which
it is associated, thus leading to mood congruent recall. However, there
is some evidence that the mood congruity hypothesis, by itself, is not
sufficient to explain all the empirical findings.

That is, under some

conditions an asymmetrical mood effect or even a mood incongruity
effect may occur. For example, though the associative network theories
(e.g., Bower, 1981) would predict symmetrical mood-congruent and
mood-state-dependent effects, such effects are not always found. That
is, the effects of sadness on negative material are not always the same as
the effects of happiness or elation on positive material. Though this has,
in fact, been the case, the study of this effect does not have the rich
empirical framework found with the study of mood congruence or state
dependence. As we shall see, most of the substantial efforts to isolate
this effect have been of fairly recent origin.
One of the patterns of results of interest here, notably asymmetrical
mood effects, was early noted by Clark and lsen (1982). Specifically, they
recognized that though good and bad moods were believed to be
opposites, their effects on memory processes did not always reflect such a
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hypothesized relationship. A number of studies have now made the
general point that while positive mood inductions facilitate the recall of
positive memories, negative mood induction does not always make the
recall of negative memories more likely (lsen, 1985).
Forgas and Moylan (1987), for example, obtained an asymmetrical
mood effect; that is, they found a lack of an effect for negative mood, but
a rather strong effect for positive mood in a study looking at the effects
of mood-inducing movies. The authors state:
This study was successful in demonstrating that exposure to
various motion pictures generates strong and demonstrable mood
effects in people, and that these moods in turn have a significant
influence on a wide variety of thematically unrelated social
judgments. We found positive mood effects to be more general and
powerful than negative mood effects. The findings may be regarded
as consistent with the predictions of recent mood-cognition
theories, such as Bower's (1981) and Clark and Isen's (1982)
models, and represent an ecologically valid extension of some
earlier laboratory and field experiments demonstrating mood
effects on social judgments. (p. 4 76 ).
These results, coming from what is taken here to be a competing
paradigm, actually fall nicely in line with the results of previous research
within the framework of LLT.

Earlier we discussed research that

demonstrated that adult patients given diagnoses such as schizophrenia,
depression, and alcoholism, might collapse the learning superiority for
positively assessed items, at times even in the direction of favoring
negative items (Mosbacher, 1984; Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, &
Abramson, 1971; Slife, Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984).

These

findings were, of course, also extended to elementary, high school, and
college students with negative self-images (August & Rychlak, 1978;
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August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975: Rychlak, Carlsen, & Dunning, 1974),
and high school students who were forced to perform a learning task that
they disliked (Rychlak & Marcell, 1986, 1992). Asymmetry of mood,
however, is still somewhat different than a mood incongruity effect. The
latter involves not only a diminution of the traditional mood congruence
effect, but an outright reversal. Such an effect, if shown to exist, poses
greater problems for traditional network theories of affect and memory.
Has such an effect been shown to exist?
Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) performed a series of experiments to
examine the possibility that mood incongruent recall occurs under some
conditions. For example, subjects in bad moods might be expected to
attempt "mood repair" by recalling material incongruent with their
prevailing mood.

They theorized, however, that standard laboratory

conditions may not be conducive to finding a mood incongruence effect
for two reasons. First, Parrott and Sabini speculated that under normal
laboratory conditions, cooperative subjects might be inclined not to
attempt mood repair if they suspected that doing so might hinder the
purposes of the experimenter.

And second, they speculated that

laboratory procedures might semantically prime mood congruent
memories and concepts, so that any initial tendencies toward moodcongruent recall would be exaggerated. To investigate these and other
hypotheses, Parrott and Sabini carried out a series of five experiments.
The first two of these were quasi-experimental designs which examined
the effect of mood on autobiographical memory in a field setting: the
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latter three were carried out in the laboratory.
In the first of their five studies, Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) employed a
quasi-experimental design, and utilized what they called "a reliable
elicitor of moods in the ecology of the undergraduate student: the return
of the graded midterm exam." They handed back exams at the beginning
of class, then proceeded to give a lecture on autobiographical memory.
This lecture, not ostensibly related to the return of their midterm exams,
included as part of a class demonstration a memory task in which
students were asked to recall and record several autobiographical
memories.

For those students who agreed to participate in the

experiment (participation was necessarily voluntary), Parrott and Sabini
(1990) found that students who received good grades (and hence were
assumed to be in good moods) recalled events that were significantly less
positive and more negative than students who received poor grades (and
hence were assumed to be in bad moods)--evidence for the mood
incongruity effect.

Interestingly, this effect, which could have been

"mood repair," appeared only for the first of the three memories recalled
by each student.
In the second of their two quasi-experiments, Parrot and Sabini
utilized another reliable elicitor of moods--the weather--to obtain the
desired effects. One advantage of this design was that it afforded greater
control over subject selection.

Specifically, they interviewed and

obtained autobiographical memories from subjects traveling to and from
the entrance to a library during either sunny or cloudy days. They found
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that subjects who were approached on sunny days (and hence were
presumed to be in good moods) recalled memories that were generally
more negative than those of subjects approached on cloudy days (and
who were presumed to be in relatively worse moods). The effect obtained
here was somewhat different from that obtained in the first study. The
authors noted:
This result only partly replicates the findings of the first study in
that a mood incongruent bias was evident only with regard to the
negative affect of the memory. Nevertheless, because there was
once again no significant evidence of mood congruent recall, it
seems justified to conclude that mood incongruent events were
recalled in both studies. (Parrott & Sabini, 1990, p. 326)
The results obtained by Parrot and Sabini (1990) in the first two of
their experiments run counter to those generally found by other
researchers (see Blaney, 1986; Singer & Salovey, 1988). The authors
speculate that several factors may have facilitated such findings. One
major difference between the mood inductions employed by Parrot and
Sabini and other researchers was the fact that the latter subjects were
not aware that their moods were relevant to the experiments. This is
much in contrast to the Velten (1968) and hypnotic procedures, which
ask subjects directly to alter their moods. Their finding held up in three
subsequent laboratory experiments, which sought to render less
plausible the hypotheses that ( 1) the type of memory might have been
responsible for the mood incongruent effect, or that (2) the type of
environment (laboratory or natural) was responsible. Ruling out this
latter possibility would greatly increase the external validity of the
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findings and would be suggestive of the directions which future research
might take.
The results of the experiments by Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) presented
something of a challenge to the formulations of LLT. According to the
LLT account. all the memories recalled should be congruent with the
affirmed mood of the subject. For this reason, Wandrei (1993) undertook
to examine more closely relevant aspects of this work. After examining
the experimental designs employed in this research, several modifications
suggested themselves. For example, rather than obtaining idiographic
measures of subject memories, Parrott and Sabini had used two judges to
independently rate the memories recalled by subjects. From the LLT
perspective, such judgments are better made on an individual basis, so
that more accurate (valid) measures of affective quality are obtained.
Second, Parrott and Sabini apparently conceptualized positive and
negative affect as independent constructs, measured separately on
independent scales.

This contrasts markedly with the LLT view of

affection, from which perspective affection is a single dimension
encompassing both positive and negative evaluations. In other words,
"more happy" can be seen at once to imply "less sad," and "more sad" to
imply "less happy" (Wandrei, 1993).
The study carried out by Wandrei was designed as a partial
replication of the Parrott and Sabini (1990) work. However, whereas the
former study employed an essentially nomothetic measure of affective
assessment, the latter obtained idiographic ratings of affective quality
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from all subjects. Further, as noted above, this affective dimension was
conceptualized--not as two separate dimensions--but rather as
oppositional in nature, and measured accordingly. Wandrei predicted
that mood congruence would be found when using idiographic measures
of affective assessment, but that such effects would not be found when
independent judges made the evaluations. What follows is a very brief
look at some of her results.
An unanticipated effect was found in the Wandrei ( 1993) study for the

memory ratings of judges, such that differences were found in ratings of
memories depending on the order in which they were recalled. These
differences were significant when one pair of judges made independent
ratings of positivity and negativity, while there was a trend toward
significance when another pair of judges used a global measure of
positivity/negativity. Further examination revealed that the main source
of the order effect was, in both cases, a tendency for the first memory
recalled to be more positively rated than the second in all groups.
Wandrei proposes that LLT could explain the observation as the result of
a naturally positive predication that subjects make when approaching a
new task or target. This could facilitate the effects of a predication based
on positive mood, and might inhibit to some extent the extension of
negative meaning that comes from a negative predication or sad mood. It
may therefore be that, in recalling memories, subjects continue to use a
"positive background framework" that is even more basic than that which
they generally take on in their affective mood state. The results of this
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research were somewhat mixed, but a clear advantage for the subjects'
idiographic ratings was found.

In other words, such results were

consistent with the LLT notion that conceptualization (predication) is a
process by which meaning is extended from a broader realm of meaning
to a narrower target.

Literature Review: Conclusions
Work on the interrelationships of mood and memory is changing to
an extent that would have been difficult to foresee even a few years ago.
New theoretical propositions are being offered, and some of these are a
great deal more consistent with the LLT position than others of the
theories we have examined. One such example has recently been pointed
out by Costanzo and Hasher ( 1989), who question the more traditional
conceptions of mood and memory (e.g.. Bower, 1981). We conclude this
section with a quote from these authors, who state:
(A] unidirectional relationship between affective and cognitive
systems is typically assumed. As in much of the historical
research on affect-cognition relationships, affective processes are
viewed as interrupting, interfering with, or directing cognitive
processes. This is true whether one employs a schematic,
semantic network, or resource allocation perspective as a
theoretical base. In all such formulations, cognitive and memorial
processes are construed as dependent or outcome variables, while
affective processes are typically manipulated or assessed as
independent or moderator variables. Although this directional
portrayal is ... plausible ... it is unlikely to provide a complete
understanding of affective-cognitive inter-relationships. Indeed,
based on clinical observation and theory ... there is good reason to
think of affect as a secondary manifestation of an underlying
cognitive process.
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The Present Study
As should now be clear, the results of a great number of the
investigations into the relationship of mood and memory have yielded
ambiguous results. From the perspective offered by LLT, much of this
confusion arises from the manner in which the individual's contribution
to knowing is construed by more traditional cognitive models.
Mechanistic formulations do not take into consideration the unique
meanings affirmed by the subjects under study. As indicated earlier, this
is the case because such theories, based on such measures as frequency
and contiguity, posit no unique role for individual affective factors. Yet,
in failing to take such factors into consideration an important
dimension of the individual's learning style is left out. As Lewis and
Williams ( 1989) suggest: "If learning material is not assessed
idiographically, then ambivalent, unstable, and eccentric affective
valences may wash out the mood-dependent retrieval effect" (p. 168).
The purpose of the present study is therefore to compare directly the
relative influences of affective assessment and mood induction on
memory performance. In doing so, we are assessing the contribution of
the subject's idiographic rating of learnable materials as against the
contribution made by an experimentally manipulated mood of the sort
that is characteristic of many of the studies in this area (see Blaney,
1986). The present study is similar in some respects to a study carried
out by Teasdale and Russell (1983), in which the effect of induced mood
on the recall of previously learned personality trait words was examined.
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Personality trait words were here arrayed in three groups based on
nomothetic averages from the Anderson (1968) norms, in order to control
for association value (see above). These words were then presented to
subjects for rating either before or after positive, negative, or neutral
mood induction. The inclusion of a control group was designed to assess
whether, for example, positive mood actually facilitates the retrieval of
positive words, and I or whether negative mood disrupts the retrieval of
positive words.

Evidence cited above indicated that the affective

consequences of mood manipulations are usually quite brief.

This

suggests that effective manipulation checks would be those that occurred
immediately or shortly after the conclusion of the induction. However,
this would then leave uncertain whether the induction effects would
persist into the crucial portions of the experiment, in the present study,
the recall and recognition tasks presented to each subject.

For this

reason, the present study has not included a mood manipulation check.
Rather than interrupting subjects as they move from the induction to
the rating task or from the induction to the memory tasks and having
them rate their moods, we have instead chosen to combine two of the
more effective mood induction techniques on the assumption that they
will be effective in eliciting the desired moods in the experimental groups.

The design of this experiment places the predictions of LLT directly
against those of Bower's (1981) nodal network theory of emotion. From
the perspective of the latter, emotion is a node within the associative
network which, when activated beyond a certain threshold, triggers
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related or associated nodes.

From the perspective of Logical Learning

Theory, affection is the ability of the individual to transcend ongoing
cognition, evaluating the contents under processing as either liked
(positive evaluation) or disliked (negative evaluation) in quality. This
ability is not learned, and hence is not merely a content within a
mediational process. Rather, the meanings precedently framed in such
acts of cognition play a very basic role (indeed, the most basic role),
sequaciously "coloring" what is to follow in thought.

CHAPTER 6
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Hypotheses
1)

Subjects asked to recall and recognize material that they have prerated for affective assessment will be found to rely more on this
idiographic measure than they will on the moods that they are
induced to perform under in a recall and recognition task.

2)

The presence of a mood induction will interact with affection
ratings, so that:

(a) Subjects in the positive mood induction

condition will show an advantage in the recall and recognition of
liked over disliked words.

(b) Subjects in the negative mood

induction condition will show a diminution of the superiority of
liked over disliked words in recall and recognition tasks. This will
manifest itself in approximately equal levels of recall and
recognition for both liked and disliked words. (c) Subjects in the
neutral condition (no mood induction) should display an
advantage in the recall and recognition of liked over disliked words.

Rationale:
Hypothesis I follows from the basic tenets of LLT discussed above. In
a population of male and female college subjects, we presume that the
90
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majority of such "well-adjusted" individuals will tend to predicate
themselves and the task at hand positively, thereby leading to a
facilitation in the learning of liked over disliked words.

Such a

prediction is based on the findings of Rychlak ( 1988 ), who has found in
numerous studies that "normal subjects reflected the typical RV-positive
effect in their learning performance" (p. 378). We therefore predict that
the person's "natural" evaluation of the experimental context (i.e., a
person's general or "background" mood) will provide a more personally
relevant framework for organizing the experimental situation, including
the information to be learned and remembered, than will the mood
supposedly "activated" by traditional mood induction procedures. Put
another way, the mood inductions employed in the present study will not
"wash out" the more general or basic effects of affection. This follows
from the fact that emotion or mood is not a "node" that can be activated,
but rather an aspect of the predicational process per se.
With regard to Hypothesis II, we have seen that predications must be
fairly negative (mood negative, self-evaluation negative, etc.) before we
diminish or flatten out the positive affective assessment effect (e.g., Slife,
Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984; August & Rychlak, 1978; Rychlak &
Marcell, 1986).

Above we discussed a study involving high school

students in which the factors of high or low self-image were crossed with
ratings of "liking" or "disliking," and an enforced paired-associates
learning task then performed. While neither of these factors by itself was
sufficient to achieve a reversal, when subjects were negative in self-image
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and forced to perform a disliked learning task, they did indeed learn

significantly more disliked than liked

eve trigrams (Rychlak

& Marceil,

1992). It is the organizing heuristic at the outset of learning that ensures
solid learning and long-lasting memory rather than sheer repetition of
such cognitions. Because the mood induction of interest here is provided
externally, LLT would argue that this is not as salient a predicating
framework as a "naturally" occurring mood state such as depression or
even a hypnotic induction procedure of the sort used by Lewis and
Williams (1989).

This may be seen clearly in work with depressed

individuals, who by definition are prone to see themselves and varying
aspects of their world in negative terms. The results of studies such as
these tend to be quite consistent, showing diminutions and even
occasional outright reversals of the typical positive affection effect.
There are two primary factors to be considered in an experimental
task of the sort being examined here: the word ratings per se, and the
mood context. Our goal is to challenge those Lockean or mediational
forms of thinking which hold that people are manipulated by externals
that direct them to learn one way or another (to recall and recognize one
way or another) based on such manipulations.

From this Lockean

perspective, any role for their unique (idiographic) influences are
considered, at best, secondary mediating factors.

Affection, however,

works at what has traditionally been called the point of "encoding." This
is therefore not a question of "input," which might suggest that an
already organized item is being "taken in" from an unpredicated external
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source.

From the LLT perspective, encoding is active organization,

including affective assessments rendered by an evaluating intellect and
brought to bear on what can and will then be "known." We thus want to
see if mood induction has an effect over and above the idiographic
ratings. In other words, does mood induction really counter the role of
affective assessment? We predict it does not.

CHAPTER 7
METHOD
Overview
Student subjects were placed into one of three mood conditions, (a)
an elated mood state, (b) a depressed mood state, or (c) a neutral mood
state. The two mood induction conditions involved the use of a variation
of the Velten ( 1968) mood induction procedure and the recall of a
relevant personal experience to induce the desired mood.

Control

subjects remained in a neutral mood, performing a filler task that
required them to solve anagram problems for a specified period of time.
All subjects rated for likability a list of 60 words, and subsequently were
given tests of recall and recognition to assess memory performance.
Subjects
Subjects came from the introductory psychology classes offered at
Loyola University of Chicago's Lakeshore Campus during the Fall
semester of 1992. Of 141 subjects initially brought into the experiment,
137 provided useful data.

Four subjects were eliminated from the

Anagram conditions because of a failure to correctly follow the
instructions.
Materials
The word list which all subjects rated contained a total of 60 words
randomly selected from the Anderson (1968) norms.
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The list was
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constructed in the following fashion: 20 words were randomly selected
from the 100 most-liked words (e.g., happy, considerate), 20 from the 100
least-liked (e.g., cold, lazy), and 20 from the neutral words ranked
between 227 and 327 (e.g., scientific, conservative) on the list of 555
personality trait words [see Appendix A for a listing of all relevant
words].

This last group of words was assumed to represent an

"ambivalent" sampling in terms of association value.

The order of

presentation of the words in the rating procedure was determined by
assigning words using a random numbers table.

The same order of

presentation was subsequently used for all subjects.
For the recognition portion of the experiment, an equal number of
words was taken from the Anderson (1968) norms to act as distractor
items. These words were chosen in the same manner as those above: 20
words were randomly selected from the 100 most-liked words, 20 from the
100 least-liked, and 20 from the neutral words ranked between 227 and
327 on the list of 555 personality trait words. The order of presentation
of the 120 words in the recognition condition was again determined by
assigning words using a random numbers table.

The same order of

presentation was used for all subjects. None of the words appearing in
the rating or recognition conditions appeared on the mood induction
statements.
Mood Induction
The mood induction procedure was a modified version of that
described by Velten ( 1968), as employed by Teasdale and Russell ( 1983)

96
[see Appendix BJ.
Anagram Task
Subjects in the anagram conditions were given forty anagrams on two
pages, each anagram consisting of five scrambled letters (e.g., AT WR E

= WATER).

The time allotted for this portion of the experiment was

equal to the amount of time subjects in the positive and negative mood
induction conditions had to read the Velten statements and record a
relevant memory (seven minutes).

A complete list of the selected

anagrams may be found in Appendix C.
Ratings of Affective Assessment
Subjects were presented with the 60 words selected from the Anderson
( 1968) norms (see above). Twenty words were taken from each of the
upper, middle, and lower third of these ratings. Subjects idiographically
rated these words using a four-point scale consisting of the following
choices: 1. Dislike Much, 2. Dislike Slightly, 3. Like Slightly, and 4. Like
Much. Subjects were asked to select the item that corresponded most
closely with his or her assessment of the word. The instructions asked
subjects not to skip any items, making whatever choice seemed most
appropriate. The relevant materials are presented in Appendix A.
Experimental Design
The present experiment required each subject to appear on one
occasion only. The experimental design crossed three levels of encoding
mood (Positive, Negative, and Neutral) with two levels of idiographic
rating (Before or After mood induction) [see Table l ]. The anagram
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Table 1. Experimental Design
Part 1

Part2

Part 3

Part 4

Group 1

Anagram

RV Rating

Recall

Recognition

Group 2

Pos. Mood

RV Rating

Recall

Recognition

Group 3

Neg. Mood

RV Rating

Recall

Recognition

Group 4

RV Rating

Anagram

Recall

Recognition

Group 5

RV Rating

Pos. Mood

Recall

Recognition

Group 6

RV Rating

Neg. Mood

Recall

Recognition
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groups represented a control condition in the present study. The list of
words which subjects were asked to remember consisted of highly
positive, negative, or neutral words according to the Anderson ( 1968)
norms.
Procedure
Subjects were selected on a voluntary basis from the introductory
psychology classes offered at Loyola University.

The experiment was

conducted in a single classroom with between three and seven subjects
per trial. Moreover, all subjects in any given trial were placed in the
same condition (one of three), (a) an elated mood state, (b) a depressed
mood state, or (c) a neutral mood state.

The two mood induction

conditions involved using a variation of the Velten ( 1968) mood
induction procedure, along with the recall of a relevant personal
experience to induce the desired mood (see Appendix B). During each
mood induction, subjects were asked to read through a set of twelve
sheets of paper, each bearing one typed self-referent statement (e.g.,
positive mood induction: "I feel pretty good right now," "Right now, I feel
like smiling"; negative mood induction: "I feel unhappy," "I feel
downhearted and miserable"). Subjects were instructed to read through
the cards and to attempt to experience the mood suggested by the
statements.

Following along the lines of the study by Teasdale and

Russell ( 1983), subjects were instructed to proceed through the cards at
a rate which would help them feel the mood suggested. The duration of
this portion of the mood induction was seven minutes, allowing roughly
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20 seconds per card. Subjects were then given three minutes to record a
relevant memory on an accompanying sheet of paper. Control subjects
remained in a neutral mood, performing a filler task requiring them to
solve anagrams for a specified period of time (seven minutes).

All

subjects rated a list of words on a four-point likability scale: half in each
condition (positive, negative, or anagram) before and the other half after
the relevant induction/ anagram procedure. Following this portion of the
experiment, all subjects were given sheets of paper containing
instructions, which were also read aloud (see Appendix D), and given two
minutes to recall as many words as possible from the first portion of the
experiment (i.e., the words which had been rated for likability). At the
end of this time recall sheets were collected, following which the
recognition forms were distributed and the accompanying instructions
read aloud (see Appendix E). Subjects were allowed to work on these for
four minutes before being told that when finished they could turn in
their sheets and receive credit for the experiment. Upon completing the
task, subjects were debriefed and dismissed.
Formulation of Scores for Data Analysis
To examine the relative contributions of affective assessment and
mood induction, there were four dependent measures in the present
study: (a) the percentage of positively and negatively evaluated words
recalled by each subject, and (b) the percentage of positively and
negatively evaluated words recognized by each subject. These values were
adjusted to reflect the percentage of such recalled and recognized words
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that fell in the liked versus disliked designations (based on the
idiographic ratings made of the words by each subject). No distinction
was drawn between those words rated "Like Much" and "Like Slightly" or
between those rated "Dislike Slightly" and "Dislike Much." This follows
from previous research on affective assessment (see Rychlak, 1988, Chap.
9).

The actual methods used to tabulate the relevant data are discussed
below. In Part I. the derivation of the recall percentage scores for both
positive and negative words is examined. In Part II, a similar format is
followed in the examination of the recognition scores. It should be noted
that the percent recall and recognition scores were subjected to an
arcsine transformation--in order to equate for distance between data
points--before undergoing analyses of statistical significance. The means
and standard deviations presented in the tables, however, reflect the
original untransformed percentage scores. Individual raw scores as well
as transformed raw scores are presented in Appendix F.
Recall Score Derivation. In order to examine the levels of recall for
positive and negative words in the six conditions of the experiment, the
following procedure was employed: As a first step, the total number of
words--from the initial list of 60--rated liked and disliked was calculated
for each subject. This involved collapsing together those words rated as
"Like Slightly" and "Like Much" to form one category of "Liked" words,
and collapsing together those words rated as "Dislike Slightly" and
"Dislike Much" to form a similar "Disliked" category. So, for example, a
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subject might rate 40 of the 60 words as liked, and 20 as disliked. Next,
those words actually recalled by each subject in the Recall portion of the
experiment were sorted in similar fashion into categories of "Liked" and
"Disliked" words. Our hypothetical subject might then recall 15 of the
words which were rated, 10 of them liked and 5 of them disliked.
The scores to be used in the omnibus analysis of variance test were
then derived in a third step. For each subject, the number of words rated
positively or negatively (calculated above) was employed as the
denominator of a fraction, with the actual number of words recalled
serving as the numerator. This procedure formed a ratio score which
took into consideration the relative percentages of words rated positively
and negatively across subjects. These scores could theoretically range
from 0%-100%, with greater numbers indicating better recall of the
relevant words. Thus, for example, the percent positive recall for our
particular subject would be calculated as follows: recall that he rated 40
of the 60 words presented as either "Like Much" or "Like Slightly"; the
relevant fraction would therefore have as the denominator the number
40; since the subject then recalled 10 of these 40 words rated positively,
the relevant fraction would be 10/40 or .25 xl00=25% (numbers were
multiplied by 100 to eliminate the decimal). In other words, the subject
would have successfully recalled 25 percent of the words he or she had
rated positively in the affection rating portion of the experiment.

A

similar procedure was followed for the computation of percent negative
recall.

To continue our example, the percent negative recall for our

102
particular subject would be calculated as follows: since he rated 20 of the
60 words presented as either "Dislike Much" or "Dislike Slightly", the
relevant fraction would have as the denominator the number 20; since
the subject then recalled 5 of these 20 words rated negatively, the
relevant fraction would be 5/20 or .25 xl00=25%. Our subject would
have successfully recalled 25 percent of the words he rated negatively in
the affection rating portion of the experiment. This procedure, carried
out across subjects, provided the relevant scores for analysis of recall
mem01y.
Recognition Score Derivation.

In the recognition condition we

again sought to take into consideration the overall percentage of words
rated positively and negatively by each subject. A relevant fraction was
computed using a method similar to that described in the recall
condition, but with one significant modification: in order to provide a
more stringent test of the hypothesis that subjects would evidence a
facilitation in recognition memory for words affectively assessed
positively, it was decided to remove from consideration those words
which had been successfully recalled (including those evaluated both
positively and negatively). In doing this, it was presumed that subjects
would be likely to recognize those words which they had recently recalled
successfully, since recall presents a more difficult test of memory than
recognition. In general, then, given the facilitation in recall memory of
positively-rated over negatively-rated words, we would see more positively
evaluated than negatively evaluated words being removed from
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consideration across subjects--thereby making an effect of positive
affection more difficult to find.
To calculate the percent recognition for our hypothetical subject, any
positively or negatively evaluated words that had been correctly recalled
were first removed from the list of recognizable items. Since our subject
correctly recalled 10 positive and 5 negative words, this would leave 4010=30 positive words and 20-5= 15 negative words that could be correctly
recognized in this portion of the experiment; thus, 30 and 15 became the
denominators for the percent positive and negative recognition,
respectively. To calculate percent recognition, the remaining correctly
recognized items were separated into those that had been initially rated
positively and those rated negatively, and divided by the appropriate
denominator. If our hypothetical subject correctly recognized 20 of the
remaining words that he had initially rated positively, he would achieve a
score of 20/30=.67 or 67%. Similarly, if he correctly recognized 10 of the
remaining words that he had initially rated negatively, he would achieve
a score of 10/ 15=.67 or 67%. This procedure, carried out across subjects,
provided the relevant scores for analysis of recognition memory.

CHAPTER 8

RESULTS

There were four dependent measures in the present study: (a) the
percentage of positively and negatively evaluated words recalled by each
subject, and (b) the percentage of positively and negatively evaluated
words recognized by each subject.

In order to test the relevant

experimental hypotheses, the data were subjected to a 2 (Order) x 3
(Induction) x 2 (Affection) repeated-measure analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with the first two variables between and the third within
subjects. Separate omnibus analyses were then carried out for both the
recall and recognition data.

Mood and Recall Learning
Hypothesis I predicted that subjects asked to recall words that they
had pre-rated for affective assessment would be found to rely more on
this idiographic measure than they would on the moods that they were
induced to perform under. A test for a main effect of Affection (withinsubjects) was significant, with subjects in all groups recalling more of
their positively assessed than their negatively assessed items, as follows:
Positive Affection M= 17.12, SD=7. 77; Negative Affection M= 14. 14,
SD=7.29(F=16.403, df= 1, 129, p<.001).
Hypothesis II predicted that the presence of a mood induction would

104

105
interact with affection ratings.

Relevant scores were entered into a

factorial analysis of variance having the characteristics of a 3 (Induction)
x 2 (Affection), with the first variable between and the second within
subjects. Was the expected effect found? The hypothesis, which can be
examined by looking at the Affection x Induction interaction, was not
significant, with the data arraying as follows: a) Positive Induction:
Positive Affection M=l6.07, SD=7.18; Negative Affection M=l4.36,
SD=7.15 b) Negative Induction: Positive Affection M= 16.03, SD=8.54;
Negative Affection M= 13.29, SD=8.02; c) Anagram: Positive Affection
M=l9.26, SD=7.58; Negative Affection M=l4.76, SD=6.71 (E=.352, df=2,
129, ll=· 704).
An unanticipated effect was found for the Order variable. Tests of
statistical significance indicated that subjects asked to rate words before
undergoing a mood induction recalled a significantly lower percentage of
learnable items than subjects undergoing a mood induction first,
suggesting that there was systematic variation produced by this variable,
as follows: rating first M= 13.46, SD=7.52; induction first M= 17. 79,
SD=7.07(F=15.809, df= 1, 129, Q<.001).
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Table 2
Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Recall Scores for the
Experimental Groups. Arrayed by Condition and Percent Positive/Negative
Recall
Mood Induction/Rating
Group

% Positive Recall

% Negative Recall

#1) Anagram <N=21):

20.81 (7.18)

16.76 (7.04)

#2) Positive (N=20):

18.00 (6.49)

17.15 (6.71)

#3) Negative (N=24):

19.54 (8.21)

14.50 (6.60)

Rating/.JMoodlnduction
% Positive Recall

% Negative Recall

#4) Anagram (N =24):

17.71 (7.77)

12. 75 (5.93)

#5) Positive (N =23):

14.13 (7.39)

11.57 (6.58)

#6) Negative (N=23):

12.52 (7.46)

12.09 (9.27)
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Mood and

Reco~nition Learnin~

For the recognition conditions, Hypothesis I again predicted that
subjects would be found to rely more on affective assessment than they
would on the moods that they were induced to perform under. A test for
a main effect of Affection (within-subjects) was significant, with subjects
in all groups recognizing more of their positively assessed than their
negatively assessed words, as follows: Positive Affection M=86.27,
SD=9.30; Negative Affection M=79.86, SD= 12.92 (F=28.840, df= l, 129,
y<.001).
Hypothesis II also predicted that the presence of a mood induction
would interact with affection ratings. Relevant scores were entered into
a factorial analysis of variance having the characteristics of a 3
(Induction) x 2 (Affection), with the first variable between and the second
within subjects. The hypothesis, which can be examined by looking at
the Affection x Induction interaction, was not significant, with the data
arraying as follows: a) Positive Induction: Positive Affection M=86.65,
SD=B.99; Negative Affection M=80. 73, SD= 13.99; b) Negative Induction:

Positive Affection M=86.33, SD= 10.47; c) Anagram: Positive Affection
M=85.84, SD=8.43; Negative Affection M=78.42, SD= 12.68 (F=0.900, df=2,
129, Q=.409).
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Table 3

Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Recognition Scores for the
Experimental Groups. Arrayed by Condition and Percent Positive/Negative
Recognition
Mood Induction/Rating
Group

% Positive Recog.

% Negative Recog.

#1 Anagram (N=21):

85.43 (8.11)

75.71 (14.22)

#2 Positive (N=20):

86.30 (9.11)

79.80 (17.44)

#3 Negative (N=24):

86.83 (11.10)

82.75 (11.12)

Rating/1yioodlnduction
Group

% Positive Recog.

% Negative Recog.

#4) Anagram (N =24):

86.25 (8.86)

81.13 (10.85)

#5) Positive (N=23):

87.00 (9.08)

81.65 (10.46)

#6) Negative (N=23):

85.83 (10.00)

78.13 (12.83)

CHAPTER 9

DISCUSSION

The results of the present experiment fall nicely in line with the
predictions of LLT--and particularly the notion that an individual's
affective assessment is of greater consequence to memory than an
external mood induction.

Indeed, the rationale of Hypothesis I was

confirmed in both the recall and recognition portions of the experiment.
In LLT, we have two factors to consider in an experimental task of the
sort being discussed here--the word rating per se, and the mood context.
Prior research, and now the present experiment as well, suggest that
predications have to be pretty generally negative, the mood negative, the
self-evaluation negative, etc., before we will flatten out the positive
affective assessment effect. It is the organizing heuristic at the outset of
learning that ensures solid learning and long-lasting memory rather than
sheer repetition of such cognitions. Affection undoubtedly serves as a
major cognitive organizer of this nature:
Framed in traditional computer lingo, this means that affection
works at the point of "encoding." But LLT would not have this be
a question of "input," which suggests that there is already an
organized item being "taken in" from an unpredicated external
source. From the LLT perspective, encoding is active organization,
including affective assessments rendered by an evaluating intellect
and brought to bear on what can and will then be "known."
(Rychlak, 1994)
As just noted, the results of the recognition portion of this
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experiment were also in the direction predicted by LLT. That is, even
when those words that had previously been remembered in the recall
portion of the experiment were removed (thereby, on average, removing a
greater number of positive than negative words from consideration), a
significant advantage was found for liked versus disliked words. This
rather robust finding lends further support to the notion that it is the
individual's predication of the task at hand that plays the greatest role
in determining memory performance. Or, put another way, we have seen
that such an effect depends upon "the subject's ability to extend
meaning to experience in fundamentally different ways, rather than on
the experimenter's ability to induce fundamentally different 'states."'
(Lewis & Williams, 1989, p. 168).

Thus, subjects who predicate

themselves, the task at hand, and the world around them in generally
positive terms are seen to extend positive meanings more readily than
negative meanings to the people and events around them. And as the
research discussed above has demonstrated, it is only when individuals
affectively assess some aspect of the world and/ or themselves in a truly
negative fashion that we are likely to observe a diminution or reversal of
this typical predicational style.
Hypothesis II, which predicted an interaction between mood
induction and affection ratings, was not supported. Instead, the general
positive affection effect predicted in Hypothesis I appeared also in the
negative mood induction conditions of the experiment. That is, in the
negative recall conditions we did not find the expected diminution of the
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positive affection effect. While at first such results may seem puzzling, a
glance back at our literature review may provide some clues as to what
may have occurred. In Group #3 of the experiment, subjects underwent a
negative mood induction, followed by the affection ratings of learnable
personality trait descriptors.

This negative mood induction, by

definition, is a negative experience. The termination of this induction
might therefore be viewed as being a slightly positive experience, at least
in contrast to what has just gone before. This is reminiscent of the work
on nonspecific transfer cited above, in which subjects moving from a
disliked to a liked task manifest greater improvement than when moving
in the opposite affective direction (positive nonspecific transfer). When
provided with the opportunity to affectively predicate the new task, the
evaluation of learnable materials, subjects may have sought to bolster
their feelings by, in a sense, re-predicating the task before them. Hence,
in predicating the rating task positively, and then carrying this generally
positive affective preference over to the recall task, words with a positive
affective quality would be favored, as happened in this group.
In Group #6, in contrast, subjects were given no opportunity to
essentially re-predicate their circumstances. Why then do we not see an
advantage of disliked over liked words?

Wandrei (1993; see above)

proposed that LLT could explain various of her observations as the result
of a naturally positive predication that subjects make when approaching
a new task or target, as of the sort seen here. This could facilitate the
effects of a predication based on positive mood, and might inhibit to
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some extent the extension of negative meaning that comes from a
negative predication or sad mood. It may therefore be that, in recalling
memories, subjects continue to use a "positive background framework"
that is even more basic than that which they generally take on in their
affective mood state. This fact is further suggested by some of the work
cited above with depressed individuals, who by definition are prone to see
themselves and the varying aspects of the world in negative terms. The
results of such studies tend to be more consistent with notions of mood
congruence, showing diminutions and even occasional outright reversals
of the typical positive affection effect. Particularly noteworthy in this
regard is the study by Slife et al. ( 1984), which showed that as depressed
individuals were successfully treated with psychotherapy, their affective
preferences shifted from being predominantly negative back toward the
usual advantage for positively evaluated materials.
One unanticipated result of the present experiment involved the
finding that subjects undergoing a mood induction first (regardless of the
type of induction), followed by the rating task, recalled a greater
percentage of learnable words (both positive and negative) than subjects
receiving the reverse task-order. This pattern of results would seem to be
an artifact of the experimental design.

In the case of those subjects

performing the affective rating task after the induction, a shorter period
of time elapsed between their having seen the words and their trying to
recall them. For subjects completing the rating task first, the presence
of an intervening task may have adversely affected their ability to recall
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the relevant materials. Such results again follow from the nature of the
process of predication. Memory is always a matter of reconceptualizing
prior experience, not just of calling to mind or activating a template or
engram from the past into the present. As time passes, memories do not
"wear down" and disappear, but rather alternative predications occur,
thereby decreasing to some extent the likelihood of recall. Increasingly
meaningful items of information are less likely to be forgotten, though
memory is still never a matter of recalling anything free of the
expectations and biases of the present.
As we have seen from our examination of the empirical research done
in both the Kantian spirit of LLT and the more Lockean framework of
nodal network theory, these formulations, by virtue of their precedent
frameworks, frame fundamentally different creatures. It is quite true
that both paradigms have been empirically rigorous in their research;
however, the differing viewpoints on how knowledge is to be accrued lead
each side to approach research very differently:
When knowledge is seen as dependent on the assumptions or
predications of the observer I participant, empirical research
becomes a way of validating the claims made by a theory with
observation. This is the "top down" approach taken by LLT:
explicit predictions made by the theory are tested in order to see if
the constructs we use to explain the world fit with the observed
world. When knowledge is seen as being derived directly from the
observations themselves, as in the view of a realist, theory is less
prominent in guiding the actual research, instead being put
together piece by piece from the observed "facts." The "bottom-up"
approach of the dustbowl empiricist attempts to rule out bias in
the observation of events by keeping theories small and directly
tied to observation. This seems to be more the case with NNTA
[Nodal Network Theory of Affect], which is referred to in many
studies of mood and memory not as a guiding formulation of the
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research, but as an explanation of the observed phenomena.
(Wandrei, 1993, p. 31)
Another point which may again be emphasized is that the affective
assessment is an active event, whereas the so-called "activations" of
network theories are passive events (much as is any other such
activation). But this simply raises the question--what differentiates the
activation of an ordinary passive sentence such as "It is raining" from an
introspectively conceived evaluation such as "I dislike rain"? The LLT
notion of a transcending telosponse is suited to rendering an account of
this phenomenon, whereas more traditional conceptions of the person
seem incapable of doing so. What would "trigger" such an evaluation?
And what would lead this evaluation to fall one direction rather than
another?

According to LLT, what mechanistic theories take to be

"activations" or "reactivations" are, in fact, simply the manifestations of
ongoing cognition, which by its nature involves the reformulation of
experience.

Hence, such activations are simply the unfolding of the

introspective organization of the individual under consideration. It is
not drive-reduction that shapes individual behavior, but rather the sense
of affective satisfaction experienced as his or her precedent assumptions
bring rewards in the form of expected/predicted outcomes (positive and
negative reinforcers).

Reflections on the Present Study
The present study suffered from several methodological limitations,
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each of which has contributed in some way to concerns about the
internal and external validity of the present findings. One limitation of
this study was its inability to separate subjects on the basis of gender.
For this reason, the experiment was incapable of detecting any
differences in recall and recognition that may have been produced by
underlying differences in gender. For example, it is possible, if not likely,
that a more pronounced finding in one gender grouping (e.g., males) may
have "boosted" the lower scores of the other (i.e., females), thereby
masking a more limited effect. The obvious answer to this problem will
be to retain appropriate records in future studies.
A second design limitation, again of considerable interest, concerns
the relative effectiveness of the mood inductions employed.

While

previous research cited above suggests that both the Velten ( 1968)
procedure and the recalling of a relevant personal memory can be
effective at eliciting a desired mood, this is ideally confirmed within the
experimental context itself. In the present experiment, we cannot be
absolutely certain that the effects of the affection ratings actually
"overcame" the salience of mood induction. If the inductions were not
truly effective, this pose difficulties for such an interpretation. We have
here assumed that with normal subjects of the sort found within a
university setting it will be somewhat difficult to achieve a diminution,
and particularly an outright reversal, of the positive affection effect
typically found--even if the mood inductions are effective. Once again,
though the argument is plausible on the basis of procedural evidence,
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the true test of such a notion lies with the validating evidence provided
within the methodological realm.
Perhaps a more minor point (though this is, of course, an empirical
question) concerns the nature of the distractor task performed by
subjects in the anagram conditions. Because the dependent measures of
the present experiment were essentially based on verbal factors, it may be
important to provide control subjects with a non-verbal task when
seeking to balance time considerations across groups. The only subjects
excluded from providing useful data were in fact subjects from the
anagram condition who confused the verbal materials of the anagram
and recall tasks.
Finally, there is the matter of the reliability of the affection ratings of
personality trait words obtained from subjects. In prior research in this
area, Rychlak ( 1988) has typically advised the use of only those words
which have been reliably rated, meaning that subjects rate words on two
separate occasions. Researchers then use only those words that have
been rated "Like Much" and "Dislike Much" on these two occasions as
learnable items. Time constraints and limitations imposed by subject
allocation requirements precluded adding this desirable feature to the
experimental design.
In order to add support to and extend the present findings, future
research may well take into consideration the points just made.
Particularly important will be efforts to validate the effectiveness of mood
inductions in studies of this sort. This may yet prove to be a formidable
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task, as there is not complete agreement on just what constitutes a
"mood."

However. it certainly seems that the framework of Logical

Learning Theory provides one feasible definition--a definition which has
held up in over twenty years of varied empirical research.
Concluding Comment
What one may hopefully see in the context of the present experiment
and discussion is that the individual human being does contribute
meaningfully to what he or she can and will know.

Through the

telosponsive process the individual aligns precedent meanings right from
birth, framing the contents of experience in logical (if not always
rational) fashion. Given that we must "know" in order "to know," the
value of a precedent affective dimension should also be readily apparent.
As a most basic aspect of the telosponsive process, affection allows the
knowledge-acquisition propensity (memory) of the human being to "get
underway." The present study is here seen as tending to confirm the
tenets of the theoretical framework from within which it arose.

The

individual does contribute meaningfully to what comes his or her way,
and unless this fact is taken into consideration, the result is likely to be
a theoretical muddle of the sort which currently exists in the field. To
emphasize the point, we close with a quote from Bower (Bower & Mayer,
1989), a quote which may be very telling of the current "state" of research
in this area:
As noted, the failure to find a mood-context effect in these
"standard context" experiments impacts negatively upon many
theories which expect it. The failure contradicts not only the first
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author's earlier theory of mood as a retrieval cue (Bower, 1981).
The failure impacts more generally upon any learning theory which
supposes that internal states act as contexts which by their
presence can become associated automatically by contiguity to
memories of coincident events, thus to later cue their retrieval.
The disconflrmed theories include not only the drive stimulus
theories noted above but also the arousal-as-cue theory of Clark,
Milberg, and Ross (1983). Moreover, to the extent that mood
influences the encoding of verbal material, the failure of MDR
[mood-dependent retrieval) on measures of recall and recognition
impacts negatively upon the principle of encoding specificity
(Tulving and Thomson, 1973). Clearly many theorists have been
wrong in expecting or explaining MDR. (p. 153)

APPENDIX A
SAMPLE IDIOGRAPHIC RATING SHEETS
FOR AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT
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On the following page you will see a list of words. Please read each word and
decide which statement most accurately describes your attitude toward that
word. Though you may find it difficult to decide for some words, please make
whatever choice seems most appropriate. Please do not leave any words

unrated.
Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

01. productive

1

3

02. grouchy

1

2
2

4
4

03. thoughtless
04. informal
05. careless
06. uncongenial
07. friendly
08. understanding

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

09. conservative

1
1

2
2

10. cheerful

1

11. honest
12. perfectionistic
13. radical
14. changeable
15. headstrong
16. ill-mannered
17. hostile
18. sincere
19.phony
20. responsible

3

3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

2

3

4

Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4

2
2
2
2
2

3
3

4
4
4
4
4
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Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

1
1
1

2
2

4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

31. scientific

1

2

4

32. unsympathetic
33. unethical
34. generous

1

2
2
2

3
3

21. warm
22. mathematical
23. foolish
24. enthusiastic
25. skillful
26. boring
27. selfish
28. courteous
29. deceitful
30. crafty

35. philosophical

1
1
1

36. considerate
37. lifeless
38. blunt
39. kind-hearted
40. meticulous

1
1
1
1
1

2

4
4

4
4

2

3
3
3

4
4

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
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Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

41. wise
42. nonchalant
43. cautious
44. optimistic

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

4
4
4
4

45. lazy

1

2

3
3
3
3
3

46. tough

1

2

3

4
4

47. cold

1

2

3

4

48. incompetent
49. pessimistic
50. interesting

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

Dislike
Much

Dislike
Slightly

Like
Slightly

Like
Much

51. modest

1

2

3

4

52.happy
53. cruel
54. forward
55. honorable

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

56. normal
57. amiable

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4
4
4
4

58. depressed

1

2

3

4

59. emotional

1

2

3

60. shrewd

1

2

3

4
4

4

APPENDIXB
SAMPLE: NEGATIVE MOOD INDUCTION STATEMENTS
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Please Read and Follow the Instructions. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask the experimenter.
On the following pages you will see a number of statements. Please read
each statement, and while reading through each of the statements, try to
experience the state suggested; that is, try to feel the mood described. Spend
roughly 20 seconds per statement, but more on those which you find
particularly effective in inducing this mood. The experimenter will notify you
when you should proceed to the next section. Please go on to the next page
now.
The following statements were employed in the depression induction:
1. I feel unhappy.
2. I feel sad and blue.
3. I feel fed up.
4. I just feel drained of energy, worn out.
5. I feel pretty low.
6. Things seem futile, pointless.
7. I feel hopeless.
8. I feel downhearted and miserable.
9. I feel so tired and gloomy that I would rather just sit than do anything.
10. I feel heavy and sluggish.
11. It seems such an effort to do much.
12. I'm fed up with it all.
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Part II. Recall of a relevant personal memory:
In the space provided, please record a NEGATIVE memory from your past
which stands out in your mind. Who was present? What makes this event
stand out as NEGATIVE? Please record any details you recall which are
relevant to the event. Your response will remain anonymous and confidential.

APPENDIXC
SAMPLE: POSITIVE MOOD INDUCTION STATEMENTS
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Please Read and Follow the Instructions. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask the experimenter.
On the following pages you will see a number of statements. Please read
each statement, and while reading through each of the statements, try to
experience the state suggested; that is, try to feel the mood described. Spend
roughly 20 seconds per statement, but more on those which you find
particularly effective in inducing this mood. The experimenter will notify you
when you should proceed to the next section. Please go on to the next page
now.
The following statements were employed in the elation induction:
1. I feel pretty good right now.
2. I feel happy.
3. I feel cheerful, confident.
4. I can think quickly and clearly right now.
5. Right now, I feel very contented.
6. Right now, I feel like smiling.
7. I feel alert, happy, and full of energy.
8. I have a feeling of lightness and joy.
9. I really like this light-hearted feeling.
10. I can feel a smile on my face.
11. I feel so good I almost feel like laughing.
12. It feels great to be alive!
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Part II. Recall of a relevant personal memorv:
In the space provided, please record a POSITIVE memory from your past
which stands out in your mind. Who was present? What makes this event
stand out as POSITIVE? Please record any details you recall which are
relevant to the event. Your response will remain anonymous and confidential.

APPENDIXD
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
IN THE ANAGRAM CONDITION
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The following groups of letters are ordinary words which have been scrambled.
Please rearrange these letters to form their respective words until the
experimenter asks you to stop.
Examples:
a) ARC= CAR
b)LCWNO=CLOWN

1.DIORA= ____ _
2.RWAET= ____ _
3.KEROJ= ____ _
4.EHNOP= ____ _
5.KTIHN= ____ _
6. WEHEL= ____ _
7.NYMOE= ____ _
8.DBIER= ____ _
9.CTARO= ____ _
10.0ERSH= ____ _
11.GUDEJ = ____ _
12.0WLEB = - - - - 13.SLACP= ____ _
14.PEOKR= ____ _
15. WSITN= ____ _
16.KPRAS= ____ _
17.HITGL= ____ _
18.NHTGI= ____ _
19.0EMVI= ____ _
20.KIRND= ____ _
21. SE RAP= ____ _
22.ALICM= ____ _
23.KSANE= ____ _
24.NHAYD= ____ _
25.RWTEI= ____ _
26.SPRAG= ____ _
27.DNRBA= ____ _
28. UPHNC= ____ _
29.KRIBC= ____ _
30.0LNVE= ____ _
31. UKTCR= ____ _
32.IPONA= ____ _
33.CHLOT= ____ _
34.HTOTO= ____ _
35.ZABEL= ____ _
36.SMEGR= ____ _
37.0CTUR= ____ _
38.PREAP= _ _ _ _ _
39.TSLEY= _ _ _ _ _
40.DAGER= _ _ _ _ _

APPENDIXE
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECALL SECTION OF EXPERIMENT
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Below are a number of blank spaces. In these spaces please write as
many words as you can recall from the list of words which you rated in
the first portion of this experiment.

APPENDIXF
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECOGNITION
PORTION OF EXPERIMENT
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Look at each of the following words and decide whether ''Yes," you saw
it previously in this experimental context. or ''No," you did not. Circle
the appropriate response. Do not skip any.
001. bold
002. conceited
003. excited

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

004. thoughtful
005. thoughtless

Yes
Yes

No
No

006. understanding
007. meticulous
008. sincere
009. bossy
010. loyal

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

011. informal
012. changeable

Yes

No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

016. modest
017. radical
018. generous

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

019. lively
020.silent

Yes
Yes

No
No

021. incompetent
022. vulgar
023. aimless

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

024. mature

Yes

No

025. grateful

Yes

No

013. warm
014. respectful
015. bashful
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026. forgiving
027. cowardly
028. selfish
029. jealous
030. humorous

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

031. happy
032. depressed
033. interesting
034. quiet
035. nonchalant

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

036. strict
037. emotional
038. cheerful
039. educated
040. honest

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

041. forward
042. reliable
043. ill-mannered
044. pessimistic
045. shrewd

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No

046. courteous
047. naive
048. snobbish
049. kind-hearted
050. blunt

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

051. wasteful
052. amiable

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No
No
No
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053. tactless
054. tolerant
055. daredevil

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

056. truthful
057. cautious
058. unsympathetic
059. witty
060. self-conscious

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

061. aggressive
062. friendly
063. tough
064. conventional
065. crafty

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

066. obnoxious
067. skillful
068. mathematical
069. wordy
070. imaginative

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

071. responsible
072. cold
073. clownish
074. deliberate
075.phony

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

076. normal
077. considerate
078. intolerant
079. capable

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

080. conservative

No

No
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081. lazy
082. productive
083. antisocial
084. trusting
085. unfair

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

086. scientific
087. skeptical
088. hostile
089. careless
090. enthusiastic

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

091. authoritative
092. shallow
093. insecure
094. deceitful
095. foolish

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

096. childish

Yes

No

097. ordinary
098. optimistic
099. boring
100. lonely

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

101. unselfish
102. perfectionistic
103. spiteful
104. philosophical
105. unpredictable

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

106. honorable
107. lifeless

Yes
Yes

No
No
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108. methodical
109. wise
110. weak

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

No

111. angry
112. headstrong
113. uncongenial
114. unethical

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

115. energetic

Yes

No

116. cruel
11 7. creative
118. spirited
119. grouchy

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

120. unkind

Yes

No

No

APPENDIX G
UNTRANSFORMED RAW SCORES

139

140
The following data represent the untransformed ratio (percentage) scores
for each subject. Columns one and two represent the percentage of
positive and negative words recalled, respectively. Columns three and
four represent the percentage of positive and negative words recognized,
respectively.
Subtect

Group

2n! I!!2

I!!!:!!

l2.!!!:

1

1

7

25

93

69

2

1

22

18

72

33

3

1

25

18

91

81

4

1

32

7

83

91

5

1

5

15

84

67

6

1

17

10

85

68

7

1

23

30

86

55

8

1

16

8

78

81

9

1

18

18

95

90

10

1

18

19

81

94

11

1

20

12

89

89

12

1

16

3

84

82

13

1

37

16

96

88

14

1

27

22

96

71

15

1

22

21

76

70

16

1

24

6

84

75

17

1

17

19

75

71

18

1

21

22

70

83

19

1

24

15

96

86

20

1

26

23

91

82

21

1

20

25

90

64

22

2

16

22

77

94

23

2

26

18

80

85

24

2

14

8

77

61

25

2

26

29

82

81

26

2

32

17

90

78

141
27

2

19

18

100

100

28

2

6

0

85

76

29

2

16

25

78

83

30

2

17

17

83

71

31

2

26

21

96

100

32

2

16

18

67

36

33

2

16

21

88

71

34

2

19

11

75

80

35

2

23

13

100

95

36

2

15

0

97

75

37

2

12

16

100

92

38

2

13

14

84

45

39

2

7

19

88

77

40

2

19

22

90

100

41

2

22

25

92

100

42

3

15

4

96

79

43

3

6

8

100

95

44

3

0

7

88

82

45

3

25

8

93

94

46

3

27

11

83

63

47

3

29

8

96

83

48

3

16

14

81

92

49

3

18

19

91

92

50

3

27

15

79

87

51

3

16

21

93

82

52

3

17

13

67

70

53

3

23

27

71

85

54

3

29

20

74

77

55

3

19

21

82

75

56

3

26

19

56

50

57

3

13

20

100

85
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58

3

18

5

94

86

59

3

7

7

97

92

60

3

24

13

88

82

61

3

30

19

83

88

62

3

31

15

90

100

63

3

11

9

98

93

64

3

24

26

93

71

65

3

18

19

93

84

66

4

31

13

58

86

67

4

21

10

91

79

68

4

12

4

93

88

69

4

13

20

96

100

70

4

14

17

88

89

71

4

19

21

84

91

72

4

26

8

79

74

73

4

29

23

87

65

74

4

11

13

88

89

75

4

29

11

80

69

76

4

8

14

74

68

77

4

15

4

76

64

78

4

9

13

88

69

79

4

20

17

92

80

80

4

25

25

96

90

81

4

16

15

82

83

82

4

13

7

92

89

83

4

29

3

100

89

84

4

25

11

92

100

85

4

6

12

87

64

86

4

18

12

82

74

87

4

13

17

95

93

88

4

18

10

88

84

143
89

4

5

6

83

75

90

5

11

16

76

87

91

5

15

15

76

60

92

5

12

15

86

96

93

5

20

7

100

96

94

5

9

11

100

92

95

5

14

13

76

76

96

5

12

18

100

77

97

5

11

0

86

74

98

5

5

0

85

63

99

5

18

8

77

85

100

5

8

13

89

77

101

5

26

24

100

84

102

5

9

7

86

72

103

5

31

7

95

83

104

5

9

11

84

71

105

5

15

15

100

90

106

5

6

21

83

74

107

5

16

7

83

93

108

5

24

13

71

75

109

5

10

10

97

86

110

5

29

24

87

79

111

5

6

3

76

89

112

5

9

8

93

100

113

6

10

16

78

78

114

6

19

21

100

88

115

6

11

0

86

71

116

6

23

13

76

73

117

6

14

12

90

70

118

6

14

4

91

65

119

6

13

40

96

63

144
120

6

3

8

64

65

121

6

28

14

76

74

122

6

6

7

94

83

123

6

2

0

67

92

124

6

8

4

83

82

125

6

11

8

97

82

126

6

0

15

83

100

127

6

11

17

94

78

128

6

18

11

100

100

129

6

16

18

97

100

130

6

14

21

87

55

131

6

9

15

87

91

132

6

6

0

83

78

133

6

19

21

76

58

134

6

27

13

93

85

135

6

6

0

69

69

APPENDIXH
TRANSFORMED RAW SCORES
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The following data represent the transformed ratio (percentage) scores for
each subject. As above, columns one and two represent the percentage of
positive and negative words recalled, respectively. Columns three and
four represent the percentage of positive and negative words recognized,
respectively. The following scores have been transformed according to
Winer ( 1965) [Appendix B.5]
Sublect Group

~

I!!2

~

f2!!!

1

1

0.5355 1.0472 2.6062 1.9606

2

1

0.9764 0.8763 2.0264 1.2239

3

1

1.0472 0.8763 2.5322 2.2395

4

1

1.2025 0.5355 2.2916 2.5322

5

1

0.4510 0.7954 2.3186 1.9177

6

1

0.8500 0.6435 2.3462 1.9391

7

1

1.0004 1.1593 2.3746 1.6710

8

1

0.8230 0.5735 2.1652 2.2395

9

1

0.8763 0.8763 2. 7093 2.4981

10

1

0.8763 0.9021 2.2395 2.6467

11

1

0.9273 0. 7075 2.4655 2.4655

12

1

0.8230 0.3482 2.3186 2.2653

13

1

1.3078 0.8230 2.7189 2.4341

14

1

1.0928 0.9764 2. 7389 2.0042

15

1

0.9764 0.9521 2.1177 1.9823

16

1

1.0239 0.4949 2.3186 2.0944

17

1

0.8500 0.9021 2.0944 2.0042

18

1

0.9521 0.9764 1.9823 2.2916

19

1

1.0239 0.7954 2.7389 2.3746

20

1

1.0701 1.0004 2.5322 2.2653

21

1

0.9273 1.0472 2.4981 1.8546

22

2

0.8230 0.9764 2.1412 2.6467

23

2

1.0701 0.8763 2.2143 2.3462

24

2

0.7670 0.5735 2.1412 1.7926

25

2

1.0701 1.1374 2.2653 2.2395
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26

2

1.2025 0.8500 2.4981 2.1652

27

2

0.9021 0.8763 3.0783 3.0783

28

2

0.4949 0.0633 2.3462 2.1177

29

2

0.8230 1.0472 2.1652 2.2916

30

2

0.8500 0.8500 2.2916 2.0042

31

2

1.0701 0.95212.72883.0783

32

2

0.8230 0.8763 1.9177 1.2870

33

2

0.8230 0.9521 2.4341 2.0042

34

2

0.9021 0.67612.09442.2143

35

2

1.0004 0.7377 3.0783 2.6906

36

2

0.7954 0.0633 2.7652 2.0944

37

2

0.7075 0.8230 3.0783 2.5681

38

2

0.7377 0.7670 2.3186 1.4706

39

2

0.5355 0.9021 2.4341 2.1412

40

2

0.9021 0.9764 2.4981 3.0783

41

2

0.9764 1.0472 2.5681 3.0783

42

3

0.7954 0.4027 2.7189 2.1895

43

3

0.4949 0.5735 3.0783 2.6906

44

3

0.0633 0.5355 2.4341 2.2653

45

3

1.0472 0.5735 2.6062 2.6467

46

3

1.0928 0.6761 2.2916 1.8338

47

3

1.1374 0.5735 2.7389 2.2916

48

3

0.8230 0. 7670 2.2395 2.5681

49

3

0.8763 0.9021 2.5322 2.5681

50

3

1.0928 0.7954 2.1895 2.4039

51

3

0.8230 0.9521 2.6062 2.2653

52

3

0.8500 0. 7377 1.9177 1.9823

53

3

1.0004 1.0928 2.0042 2.3462

54

3

1.1374 0.9273 2.0715 2.1412

55

3

0.9021 0.95212.26532.0944

56

3

1.0701 0.9021 1.6911 1.5708
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57

3

0. 7377 0.9273 3.0783 2.3462

58

3

0.8763 0.4510 2.6467 2.3746

59

3

0.5355 0.5355 2.7819 2.5681

60

3

1.0239 0. 7377 2.4341 2.2653

61

3

1.1593 0.90212.29162.4341

62

3

1.1810 0.7954 2.4981 3.0783

63

3

0.67610.60942.8240 2.6062

64

3

1.0239 1.0701 2.6062 2.0042

65

3

0.8763 0.90212.60622.3186

66

4

1.1810 0.7377 1.7315 2.3746

67

4

0.95210.64352.5322 2.1895

68

4

0.7075 0.4027 2.6062 2.4341

69

4

0.7377 0.9273 2.7440 3.0783

70

4

0.7670 0.8500 2.4341 2.4655

71

4

0.9021 0.9521 2.3186 2.5322

72

4

1.07010.57352.1895 2.0715

73

4

1.1374 1.0004 2.4039 1.8755

74

4

0.67610.73772.4341 2.4655

75

4

1.1374 0.67612.21431.9606

76

4

0.5735 0.7670 2.0715 1.9391

77

4

0.7954 0.4027 2.1177 1.8546

78

4

0.6094 0.7377 2.4341 1.9606

79

4

0.9273 0.8500 2.5681 2.2143

80

4

1.0472 1.0472 2.7288 2.4981

81

4

0.8230 0.7954 2.2653 2.2916

82

4

0.7377 0.5355 2.5681 2.4655

83

4

1.1374 0.3482 3.0783 2.4655

84

4

1.0472 0.6761 2.5681 3.0783

85

4

0.4949 0. 7075 2 .4039 1.8546

86

4

0.8763 0.7075 2.2653 2.0715

87

4

0.7377 0.8500 2.6906 2.6062
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88

4

0.8763 0.6435 2.4341 2.3186

89

4

0.4510 0.4949 2.2916 2.0944

90

5

0.67610.82302.1177 2.4039

91

5

O. 7954 0. 7954 2.1177 1. 7722

92

5

0.7075 0.7954 2.3746 2.7189

93

5

0.9273 0.5355 3.0783 2.7189

94

5

0.6094 0.67613.07832.5681

95

5

0. 7670 0. 7377 2.1177 2.1177

96

5

0.7075 0.8763 3.0783 2.1412

97

5

0.67610.06332.3746 2.0715

98

5

0.4510 0.0633 2.3462 1.8338

99

5

0.8763 0.5735 2.1412 2.3462

100

5

0.5735 0.7377 2.4655 2.1412

101

5

1.0701 1.0239 3.0783 2.3186

102

5

0.6094 0.5355 2.3746 2.0264

103

5

1.1810 0.5355 2.7045 2.2916

104

5

0.6094 0.67612.31862.0042

105

5

0.7954 0.7954 3.0783 2.4981

106

5

0.4949 0.9521 2.2916 2.0715

107

5

0.8230 0.5355 2.2916 2.6062

108

5

1.0239 0.7377 2.0042 2.0944

109

5

0.6435 0.6435 2.7876 2.3746

110

5

1.1374 1.0239 2.4039 2.1895

111

5

0.4949 0.3482 2.1177 2.4655

112

5

0.6094 0.5735 2.6062 3.0783

113

6

0.6435 0.8230 2.1652 2.1652

114

6

0.9021 0.9521 3.0783 2.4341

115

6

0.67610.06332.3746 2.0042

116

6

1.0004 0. 7377 2.1177 2.0488

117

6

0.7670

118

6

0.7670 0.4027 2.5322 1.8755

o. 7075 2.4981

1.9823
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119

6

0.7377 1.3694 2.7189 1.8338

120

6

0.3482 0.5735 1.8546 1.8755

121

6

1.1152 0. 76702.1177 2.0715

122

6

0.4949 0.5355 2.6467 2.2916

123

6

0.2838 0.0633 I.9177 2.5681

124

6

0.5735 0.4027 2.2916 2.2653

125

6

0.67610.57352.7762 2.2653

126

6

0.0633 0.7954 2.2916 3.0783

127

6

0.67610.85002.6467 2.1652

128

6

0.8763 0.6761 3.0783 3.0783

129

6

0.8230 0.8763 2.7707 3.0783

130

6

0.7670 0.95212.40391.6710

131

6

0.6094 0.7954 2.4039 2.5322

132

6

0.4949 0.0633 2.2916 2.1652

133

6

0.9021 0.95212.11771.7315

134

6

1.0928 0.7377 2.6062 2.3462

135

6

0.4949 0.0633 1.9606 1.9606
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